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Whatever Happened to Durland?: Mail Fraud,
RICO, and Justifiable Reliance
Mr. Gerry [of Massachusetts] doubt[ed] whether the.Judiciary
ought to form a part of... [a Council of Revision] .... It
was quite foreign from the nature of... [their] office to make
them judges of the policy of public measures.
-James Madison
"[I]t would take 4,000 years before the bank robbers in this
country could steal as much as the S&L fraud kingpins have stolen
from the American public."2 The incredible magnitude of the
savings and loan crisis is just one example of the impact of white-
collar crime. "White-collar crime is 'the most serious and all-perva-
sive crime problem in America today.'"' It is "characterized by
trickery, concealment, or violation of trust. 4 The federal mail
1 JAmEs MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATEs IN THE FEDERAL CONVENnON OF 1787, at 61-
62 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (the motion failed 8 to 3).
2 Amazing Tales of the Lost S&L Booty, NAT'L J., Sept. 22, 1990, at 2246 (qUoting
Sen. Joseph IL Biden Jr., D-Del., in a debate on antifraud legislation; figure based upon
the amount thieves stole from banks in 1989 and the cost of the savings and loan bail-
out).
S Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 n.9 (1988) (quoting John B. Conyers,
Corporate and WhiteC ollar Cime: A View by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime,
17 AM. CRIM. L Ra'v. 287, 288 (1980)).
As bad as white-collar is, it is doubtful if its impact on day-to-day life is worse than
crimes of violence. See, e.g., Isabel Wilkerson, Chicago Plans Baniers to Hinder Street Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at A6 (reporting 938 homicides in 1992, many of which were
gang and drug related drive-by shootings). Nevertheless, because white-collar crime is not
so closely related to seemingly intractable socio-economic conditions, it ought to be a
high priority of governmental action, if only because such action promises hope of relief.
See United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.) ("In our com-
plex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for
inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar."), cert. denied 377
U.S. 953 (1964).
4 1991 Arr'y GFN. AN. REP. 9.
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fraud statute5 is aptly described as the "first line of defense"
against such fraudulent activity.'
In 1896, the Supreme Court held in Durland v. United States?
that the phrase "scheme to defraud" was not limited to facts that
would fall within the common-law crime of obtaining money by
false pretenses or the common-law tort of deceit. Indeed, it in-
volves any form of "trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching."8 The
5 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 1991). The statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to
do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any mat-
ter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be deliv-
ered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is
directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter
or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both. If the violation affects a financial institution, such person shall be
fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
id-
6 See, e.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, CJ., dissent-
ing). In addition to the mail fraud statute, the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(Supp. III 1991), is another antifraud provision. It states:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign com-
merce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of exe-
cuting such scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both. If the violation affects a financial insti-
tution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not
more than 30 years, or both.
Id
Although wire fraud is not the focus of this Note, the statute should be considered
when evaluating these materials. Since the mall and wire fraud statutes are in paii mate-
r/a, case law treatment of the wire fraud statute is applicable to the mail fraud statute.
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987). Mail fraud is distinct from wire
fraud in that wire fraud requires proof of an interstate, or international, communication
through the relevant media (telephone, telegraph, radio, or television). By contrast, mail
fraud is satisfied by any mailing through the United States Postal Service. Use of courier
services such as Federal Express, however, do not qualify. See JED S. RAKoFF & HoWARD
W. GOLDSTEIN, Rico CIVL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY § 2.02[1][b] (1992).
7 161 U.S. 306 (1896) (scheme to defraud includes false promises of future con-
duct).
8 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (quoting McNally v. United
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only substantive areas excluded from "scheme to defraud" by the
Supreme Court are violence9 and schemes not aimed at obtaining
property, both tangible and intangible."
Despite the Supreme Court's clear teachings, the circuit courts
are mistakenly reading common-law limitations taken from the ju-
risprudence of the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses
and the tort of deceit into the law of mail fraud when it is civilly
enforced through the provision of the Racketeer Influenced Cor-
States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182,
188 (1924))); see also Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 627 (1926) ("something of
value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching") (quoting Hamrerschmidt v. United
States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)). See generally Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 860-
61 (1966); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910); see also Wilcox v. First Interstate
Bank of Oregon, 815 F.2d 522, 531 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the elements of com-
mon-law fraud and RICO fraud).
9 Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 628 (1926).
10 Compare McNally, 483 U.S. at 356 (intangible rights excluded) with Capentaer, 484
U.S. at 27 (intangible property included).
In response to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute in McNaUy, Con-
gress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346. In McNaUy, the Court held that the mail fraud statute
did not apply to schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible right to honest govern-
ment. The appeal involved a government official and a private citizen convicted for mail
fraud in selecting insurance agencies in Kentucky. The prosecution argued that the
defendants' scheme deprived citizens of the right to have the Commonwealth's affairs
conducted honestly. The Court held that the statute was "limited in scope to the protec-
tion of property rights," 483 U.S. at 360, and did "not refer to the intangible right of
the citizenry to good government." Id. at 356. Congress overturned the Court's interpreta-
tion with the enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 1992). The "amendment restore[d]
the mail fraud provision to where that provision was before the McNally decision." 134
CONG. REC. H11108, 11251 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Conyers). See
Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886 F.2d 16, 19 n.4 (2d Cir. 1989).
Section 1346 states:
For the purposes of this chapter, the term "scheme or artifice to defraud"
includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of hon-
est services.
18 U.S.C. § 1346.
Curiously, Congress did not amend the travel fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988
& Supp. III 1991), which is drafted similar to the federal mail fraud statute. In pertinent
part, section 2314 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transports or causes to be transported, or
induces any person or persons to travel in, or to be transported ....
Id. The issue could have been resolved by placing the definition of "scheme to defraud"
in the general provisions chapter of Title 18 (18 U.S.C. §§ 1-20 (1988)). The definition
then would apply to all of Title 18. Instead, the definition created by the Act, found at
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 1992), applies to Title 18, chapter 63--mall fraud, which only
includes sections 1341-1346. As such, the definition does not apply to section 2314.
1992]
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rupt Organizations Act (RICO). 1 Although the circuit courts are
not clear in expressing their rationale, they are using the "by
reason of" language of RICO (proximate cause element) 2 to im-
pose on the RICO claimant the common-law requirement of justi-
fiable reliance. The issue then is whether or not such a claimant
must allege and prove justifiable reliance on a fraudulent misrep-
resentation or omission to state a RICO claim predicated on mail
fraud.
This Note argues that justifiable reliance is neither historically
nor analytically necessary to prove mail fraud in a civil RICO con-
text or otherwise. Mistakenly confusing mail fraud with common-
law fraud,"3 the courts that hold to the contrary are adopting the
discredited eighteenth century rationales that underlie the com-
mon-law crime of obtaining property by false pretense or the com-
mon-law tort of deceit. This Note further explores the adverse
social ramifications of adopting these legal theories amidst the
pervasiveness of white-collar crime. 4
Parts I, II, and III of this Note examine and contrast the
development of the jurisprudence of common-law crimes against
property, the common-law tort of deceit, and mail fraud. A com-
parison of these three histories clearly demonstrates what mail
fraud is and what mail fraud is not. Mail fraud evolved out of the
common law theft-crimes, in particular common-law cheating. The
concept of reliance, on the other hand, emerged in the context of
the development of the crime of obtaining property by false pre-
tenses and the tort of deceit. In light of this history, Part IV exam-
ines the mail fraud statute and its interpretation in criminal prose-
cutions. While this jurisprudence establishes that mail fraud does
not require representation, reliance, or obtaining property, it also
identifies an improper trend to introduce reliance and require it
when mail fraud is used as a predicate in civil RICO claims. Part
V presents the economic and social implications of this misguided
interpretation of the two statutes. This Note concludes that the
doctrine of justifiable reliance ought not play a determining role
11 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. III 1991 & Supp. 1992).
12 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988). See infra Part IV.B.9 for a discussion of the "by rea-
son of" provision in the RICO statute.
13 See, e-g., Armco Indus. Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co., 782 F.2d 475, 481
(5th Cir. 1986). Se infra Part IV.B.
14 See In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 785 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.) ("Consequences can-
not alter statutes, but may help to fix their meaning."), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918).
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in the interpretation of the federal mail fraud statute in the RICO
context.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THEFT:
PRECURSOR TO MAIL FRAUD
The statement that mail fraud does not have an "obvious
precursor"15 is mistaken. A careful examination of the develop-
ment of the common-law theft offenses points to common-law
cheating as the precursor of mail fraud. Such an examination also
points away from the offense of obtaining property by false pre-
tenses and the tort of deceit. The development of these criminal
offenses and their tort counterparts, too, must be carefully distin-
guished.
The English Legal System made a clear distinction between
the concepts of crime and tort. Crimes were considered acts sanc-
tioned by the legal system "in the interests of society at large, and
in order to prevent any repetition of the acts forbidden." 6 Torts
were, in contrast, characterized as
minor wrongful acts which the State regards with disfavour, but
does not deem deserving of fine or imprisonment; these acts
the State forbids, but not in the .same direct and positive man-
ner as that in which it forbids criminal acts. The State gives to
the individual injured the right to sue for compensation, but
leaves it to him to decide whether he will exercise this right or
not.
17
Thus, as the common law evolved, concepts of crime and tort
evolved in separate spheres.
A. Larceny
In essence, the modem law of theft is a product of the eigh-
teenth century. 8 Common law English judges developed larceny
as the first of the modem theft crimes.1 9 At common law, larceny
15 See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L REv. 771,
779 (1980).
16 1 W. BLAKE ODERs & WALTER BLAKE ODGERS, THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND
405 (1920).
17 Id.
18 "Except for Carrier's Case and two important developments in the early sixteenth
century ... practically the entire modem law of theft has been a product of the eigh-
teenth century." JEROME HALL, THEFr, LAw AND SocErY 4 (1935).
19 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoT, JR., CRwnwAL LAw § 8.1, at 702 (2d ed.
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was perpetrated when the offender misappropriated another's
property by means of taking it from his possession without con-
sent.20 "Larceny at common law . . . [was] the (1) trespassory (2)
taking and (3) carrying away of the (4) personal property (5). of
another (6) with intent to steal it."2 1 The essential element in
larceny was that the perpetrator must take property from the
victim's possession. 22 Larceny had to result in a dispossession of
the victim's property.
23
When the English judges created the crime of larceny, they
focused on dispossession in the context of face-to-face encounters.
Indeed, the offense was designed to avoid personal violence rather
than to protect property from theft.24 The judges recognized that
an "unauthorized taking of property, . . . from the owner's posses-
sion [is] apt to produce an altercation if the owner discovers the
property moving out of his possession in the hands of the
thief."25 In contrast, when the perpetrator had the victim's prop-
erty in his possession at the time he misappropriated it,26 or if
the perpetrator obtained the property by telling lies, 27 a similar
danger of a breach of peace was not present.
28
Gradually, the English judges expanded the scope of larceny
to accommodate the different needs of more modem manufactur-
ing and commercial business transactions.' As the social order
changed, the judges moved to protect property as such in a
1986) (modem theft crimes are principally larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses).
20 Id.; see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 292 (3d ed.
1982). Larceny is defined as
the trespassory taking and carrying away of the personal property of another
with intent to steal the same.
It was one of the few felonies under the common law of England. Under
modem American statutes it is either a felony or a misdemeanor depending
upon the value of the property stolen.
Id. (citations omitted).
21 LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 19, § 8.2, at 706. Modern American statutes have
generally retained this definition. Id.
22 Id. § 8.1.
23 Pulakis v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 475 (Alaska 1970).
24 I.AFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 702 ("The judges who determined the
scope of larceny (including its limitations) apparently considered larceny to be a crime
designed to prevent breaches of the peace rather than aimed at protecting property from
wrongful appropriation.").
25 Id. at 702-03.
26 See infa .Part .B (embezzlement).
27 See infra Part I.D (false pretenses).
28 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 19, at 703.
29 Id.
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changing marketplace. The English judges, thus, modified the ele-
ments of larceny to include acts of breaking bulk,s constructive
possession,31 and larceny by trick. 2
1. Breaking Bulk
Breaking bulk occurred when a bailee, while in possession of
another's packaged goods, broke open the bales and misappropri-
ated the contents. Unlike common-law larceny, breaking bulk did
not threaten an eruption of personal violence. Nevertheless, in
Carrier's Case,"3 the court found that a larceny had occurred. A
foreign merchant hired the defendant to transport bales of mer-
chandise. Contrary to the merchant's request, the defendant con-
verted the bales; he was then arrested and tried for a felony. Prior
to Carrier's Case, the law required that "there be a direct, overt
taking of goods from another's possession."s Thus, the conver-
sion of property legally obtained was merely a breach of trust and
not a crime, and the conduct merely gave rise to a civil cause for
damages. Notwithstanding the narrow reach of the former law,
however, the Carrier court found the defendant guilty of larceny.
The court adopted a patent fiction theory that he "'broke
bulk'-whereupon, it was said, the property immediately reverted
to the 'possession' of the consignor, and the removal of the mer-
chandise then provided the technically necessary 'trespass.'"3 Ac-
cordingly, the common law of larceny came to include, not only a
taking from actual possession, but also breaking bulk by a bailee,
as there was a "felt... [necessity] to protect the mercantile trade,
which was then growing apace in England." 6
2. Constructive Possession
Constructive possession, or possession where no actual posses-
sion exists, occurred in three situations: (1) a master or employer
delivers his property to his servant or employee to use or to keep
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 704.
33 Anonymous v. The Sheriff of London, "The Case of the Carrier who Broke Bulk,"
Y.B 13 Edw. 4, pl. 5 (1473), rerinted in 64 SELDEN Soc'Y 30 (1945).
Carrier's Case has been described as one of the "most important decisionts] for the
entire modem law of theft." HALL, supra note 18, at 3.
34 HALL, supra note 18, at 3.
35 Id. at 4.
36 LAFAVE & ScoTt, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 703.
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or to deliver for the master; (2) the owner of the property loses it
or mislays it; or (3) a property owner delivers the property to
another person as part of a transaction to be completed in the
owner's presence. 7 For example, as early as 1729 in Tunnard's
Case,' the English judges began to develop the concept of "con-
structive possession" in terms of fraudulent takings. Tunnard bor-
rowed a horse stating that it was for a three-mile trip. Instead,
however, he rode to London and proceeded to sell the horse. The
Tunnard court held it was larceny because the "fraud supplied the
place of force."3 9 Similar to the "make-believe" with respect to
breaking bulk, the law came to recognize that constructive posses-
sion was sufficient to meet larceny's possession requirement.
°
3. Larceny By Trick
Larceny by trick was a subset of larceny similar to the scenari-
os of breaking bulk and constructive possession.41 A perpetrator,
who obtained possession of, but not title to, another's property by
lies and then fraudulently intended to convert the property, was
guilty of larceny. Thus, if the possession but not the title to the
property was misappropriated by lies, the crime became larceny by
trick.' Accordingly, larceny by trick was the use of lies to obtain
possession of property, but not title.' Larceny by trick was not
separate from larceny, as it too' required a dispossession. Instead,
the development of larceny by trick modified what was meant by
possession.
Larceny by trick developed out of Pear's Case." Pear hired a
horse for travel and said that he would return it by eight o'clock.
When he did not return, he was indicted for larceny. The trial
evidence disclosed that rather than using the horse for travel, he
instead sold the horse. Accordingly, Pear went before a jury under
charges of horse theft. The judge instructed the jury to determine
37 Ia. at 703-04.
88 2 SIR EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROwN 687 (1806);
see also PERKINS & BoYcE, supra note 20, at 804.
89 Tunnard's Case, 2 EAST, supra note 38, at 688. "And Lord C. J. Raymond, who
tried the prisoner, left it to the jury to consider, Whether Tunnard rode away with [a
brown mare] with an intent to steal her? and the jury found him guilty." Id. at 687.
40 LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 19, at 704.
41 See, e.g., LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 19, § 8.2(e), at 711 n.33 ("Although known
as 'larceny by trick,' the crime is larceny, not a crime separate from larceny.")
42 ld. § 8.1, at 711.
43 Obtaining title would be false pretenses. See infra Part I.D.
44 Rex v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (KB. 1779).
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what Pear's intent was at. the time of hiring the horse. If Pear's
intent was to use the horse for travel, and it was only afterwards
that he was tempted to sell the horse, the jury was directed to
find a verdict of not guilty.' But, if the jury found that Pear's
journey was a mere "pretence to get the horse into his possession"
and that he always intended to sell it, they should return a special
verdict.' The jury reached the special verdict that "he hired the
horse with a fraudulent view, and intention of selling [the horse]
immediately."4 7 On appeal, the court considered whether Pear's
conversion was a mere breach of trust or a felony. Because the
jury determined that the hiring was fraudulent, the majority
found' that "the parting with the [horse] had not changed the
nature of the possession, but that it remained unaltered in the
prosecutor at the time of the conversion .... .49 Thus, the court
found Pear guilty of a felony.5"
The Pear court heavily relied on the decision in Carrier's
Cas& The Pear court read the Carrier decision as settling "that
the taking need not be by force."52 Thus, the Carrier decision was
45 Id. at 209 ("[The Learned Judge] left it with the Jury to consider, Whether the
prisoner meant at the time of the hiring to take such journey, but was afterwards tempt-
ed to sell the horse? for if so he must be acquitted . .
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 There was a great deal of disagreement among the judges. Seven held it to be
felony, two judges dissented; and two were uncertain. 2 EASr, supra note 38, at 686; 168
Eng. Rep. at 209.
49 Id. at 209.
50 At this early date, England did not have a system of court reporters. Thus, deci-
sions like Pear were reported, if at all, by an interested member of the legal profession.
Pear was reported by Thomas Leach, Esq., see supra note 44, and discussed by Sir Ed-
ward Hyde East in his treatise. See supra note 38.
The holding reported by East was that Pear obtained possession of the horse when
it was delivered to him. Because of his fraud, he obtained possession by trespass. Further,
because he rode away with this intent, he was guilty, of larceny. 2 EASr, supra note 38, at
688. See generaly PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 305.
The report provided in Leach gave a different result. The Leach reporter stated
that because the defendant had committed fraud, he did not acquire legal possession of
the horse. 1 Leach at 212; 168 Eng. Rep. at 208. This report confused the idea of legal
possession and lawful possession. Indeed, what should have been reported was that the
defendant did not acquire lawful possession because of his fraud and, therefore, he ob-
tained possession by trespass. PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 305.
51 See, e.g., Joseph H. Beale, Jr., The Borderland of Larceny, 6 HARV. L. REV. 244
(1892) ("The decision [in Pear's Case] is an application of the rule established, or sup-
posed at that time to have been established, by the Carrier's Case, the only other author-
ity cited by the [Pear] court."). Id. at 250.
52 HALL, supra note 18, at 12.
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extended to include a taking without force. 'This interpretation
removed the ancient [requirement of] vi et armis much farther
from the requirements- of larceny and gave rise to larceny by trick.
Fraud in securing possession joined breaking bulk to completely
modify the definition of larceny.
"5s
In 1782, following Pear's Case, the English courts decided Rex
v. Patch.' In Patch, the defendants held out a counterfeit dia-
mond ring as a valuable piece of jewelry. The defendants fraudu-
lently exchanged the ring with the prosecuting witness for the
price of a genuine ring. The defendants argued that this was
merely fraud. Rejecting the defendants' argument, the court found
the defendants guilty of larceny. The Patch court stated "that the
possession was obtained by fraud, and the property [title] was not
altered; for the prosecutor was to have it again . . . ."
In a later case, Young v. Rex,56 dealing with a similar scheme,
the defendant, like the Patch defendants, tried to argue that the
scheme was merely an act of fraud. Yet, the majority, relying on
Pear's Case, convicted the defendant of larceny because the money
was conveyed as a promise "'so that though the possession was
parted with, the property was not.' Despite the dubious application
of the principle, this distinction became the basis for differentiat-
ing fraud from larceny by trick, and the distinction has persisted,
with few changes, until the present time." 7 As these cases dem-
onstrate, the concept of possession rather than title was crucial for
a finding of larceny. The English law distinction continued to
plague American courts in the early twentieth century. In People v.
53 Id.
54 168 Eng. Rep. 221 (K.B. 1782).
55 168 Eng. Rep. at 222 n.(a); HALL, supra note 18, at 13 (citing Patch).
56 100 Eng. Rep. 475 (KB. 1789).
57 HALL, supra note 18, at 13-14 (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote stated:
Upon reviewing the authorities there collected it will appear that the distinction
so far as regards the subject of the present inquiry turns mainly upon the con-
sideration whether or not the owner deceived by appearances intended to part
with the absolute property, and not barely with the possession or temporary use of
the thing at the time of the delivery, rather than upon any actual difference in
the degree of fraud meditated by rather than upon any actual difference in the
degree of fraud meditated by the taker, the intent in both instances being dis-
honestly to acquire and convert to his own use the property of another without
any or an adequate consideration.
Id. at 14 n.28 (citation omitted).
The development in this area, however, is not without controversy. See, e.g., id. at 14
(discussing Professor Beales' exception).
For a brief discussion of the sanctions available at this time see id. at 15.
(Vol. 68:333
NOTE-MAIL FRAUD,-RICO, AND JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE
Miller; for example, the defendant obtained the victim's money
by making various false promises. The court seemed determined
to convict Miller for larceny, as it was a felony. Thus, the court
had to struggle to find "possession" and not "title" to the money
to uphold the defendant's larceny conviction.59 If the court
found that the defendant had parted with title, as well as posses-
sion, the defendant would not have been guilty of larceny.
B. Embezzlement
Breaking bulk, constructive possession, and larceny by trick
each enlarged the concept of possession, a necessary element for
larceny. Yet, as the market became more complex, the inherent
limitations of the law of larceny as a prosecutorial tool became
increasingly apparent. Bazeley's Case'° well-illustrates the inadequa-
cy of the crime of larceny in typical, modem, commercial
transactions. In Bazeey, a bank customer gave a bank clerk money
for a deposit. Intending to misappropriate the money, the bank
clerk, however, put the money in his pocket rather than in the
bank's cash drawer. The Bazeley court held that the constructive
possession concept did not apply to property coming to an em-
ployee for his employer from a third person until the employee
hands the property to the employer or puts the property in the
employer's container for safe keeping. Accordingly, the bank clerk
was not guilty of larceny. Absent any law prohibiting such conduct,
the defendant was innocent."
In light of the law's inadequacy in Bazeley, Parliament moved
to remedy the situation.62 In 1799, the same year as the Bazeley
decision, Parliament adopted the first embezzlement statute.6
58 62 N.E. 418 (N.Y. 1902).
59 Id at 423; see also LAFAVE & ScOTr, supra note 19, § 8.1, at 711 n.35.
60 Rex v. Bazeley, 168 Eng. Rep. 517 (KB. 1799); see also 2 EAsT, supra note 38, at
571 (discussing Bazeley's Case).
61 Id.
62 The authorities explain that
[t]he statutes which created what has come to be known as the crime of "em-
bezzlement" were enacted, not to clarify any doubt as to the common law, but
to provide penalties for certain types of misconduct that had been held to be
outside the scope of larceny.
PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 352; HALL, supra note 18, at 28 ("In 1799 Bazeley's
Case . . . brought on the first general embezzlement statute."); see also PERKINS & BOYCE,
sup-a note 20, at 352-54 (providing a general discussion of embezzlement's legislative his-
tory).
63 An Act to Protect Masters Against Embezzlements by their Clerks or Servants,
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The statute provided that an employee, who received by virtue of
his employment, money or goods for his employer and who fraud-
ulenfly converted the same, was guilty of embezzlement. Evolving
out of the 1799 statute, the modem crime of embezzlement is
generally defined as the fraudulent conversion of the property of
another by one who was already in lawful possession of it.'
The growth of industry, especially the banking industry, car-
ried with it a significant impact on the development of embezzle-
ment.' Embezzlement statutes developed in response to:
(1) the expansion of mercantile and banking credit and the
use of credit mechanisms, paper money and securities; (2) the
employment of clerks in important positions with reference to
dealing with, and in particular, receiving valuables from third
persons; (3) the interests of the employing commercial classes
and their representation in Parliament; (4) a change in atti-
tude regarding the public importance of what could formerly
be dismissed as merely a private breach of trust; and (5) a
series of sensational cases of very serious defalcations which set
the pattern into motion and produced immediate action.6
Other factors cited as affecting the development of the law in
these areas included the increase in inter-community transactions,
the gradual disappearance of gild regulation, and the explosion of
new enterprises. 7 As a result of these changes, buyer-seller rela-
tionships became increasingly impersonal.' Thus, the certain pro-
tection derived from face-to-face exchanges was lost.
C. Common-Law Cheat
Paralleling the common law of larceny, and the legislated
offense of embezzlement, the English judges and Parliament cre-
ated the common law of cheat as yet another offense protecting
the marketplace.' At common law, a cheat was a fraud perpetrat-
1799, 39 Geo. 3, ch. 85 (Eng.).
64 LAFAVE & ScorT, supra note 19, § 8.6, at 729.
65 HAi, supra note 18, at 27-28.
66 Id. at 28-29 (footnote omitted) (These conditions are similar in kind to those
giving rise to the mail fraud statute, see infra Part II. Certainly, the underlying need for
regulation is in direct contrast with the policies of caveat emptor. See infra Part II.).
67 HALL, supra note 18, at 31.
68 Id. at 32.
69 The commentary to the Model Penal Code explains:
This offense required use of false weights or similar "tokens," thus limiting
criminal deception to certain special techniques conceived as directed against
the public generally. One may suspect that this development was an outgrowth
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ed by some false symbol or token that injured another's property
interest 7 The judges reasoned that a token, such as a counter-
feit letter, gave "effect, character, and credibility to the verbal
falsehood."7' Thus, a scheme perpetrated without the use of such
a 'token was not indictable even if it included fraudulent misrepre-
sentations of fact that were a substantial departure from the truth
and that deceived another into parting with the title to his chat-
tel.
72
Because a token had to be more than false words,73 a mere
lie did not qualify as a token. Rather, a token signified something
"real" and "visible" such as a ring, a key, a seal or other mark, or
of guild regulation of unfair competition as much as it reflected a desire to
protect the buying public. At any rate, the use of false tokens was a technique
against which it would be difficult for even a cautious yeoman to guard him-
self.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1, at 129-30 (1980).
70 2 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 143, at 105 (John M. Zane
& Carl ZolIman eds., 9th ed. 1923) (citation omitted); see also A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CRIMES (CLARK & MARSHALL) § 12.30, at 837 (Melvin F. Wingersky rev., 6th ed. 1952)
(discussing common-law cheating and false tokens) [hereinafter CLARK & MARSHALL].
Bishop points out that cheating statutes typically retained the token concept. For
example, 33 Hen., 8, ch. 1 §§ 1, 2 "affirmed the common law adding little or noth-
ing . . . ." BISHOP, supra, at 106. Section 1 of the statute recites:
[Miany light and evil-disposed persons, not minding to get their living by
truth. ... but compassing and devising daily how they may unlawfully obtain
and get into their hands and possession goods, chattels, and jewels of other per-
sons for the maintenance of their unthrifty living; and also knowing that if they
came to any of the same goods, chattels, and jewels by stealth, then they, being
thereof lawfully convicted .... shall die therefore,-have now of late falsely and
deceitfully contrived, devised, and imagined psivy tokens and counterfeit letters in
other men's names, unto divers persons their special friends and acquaintances,
for the obtaining of money, goods, chattels, and jewels of the same persons,
their friends and acquaintances; by color whereof the said light and evil-disposed
persons have deceitfully and unlawfully obtained and gotten great substance of
money, goods, chattels, and jewels into their hands and possession, contrary to
right and conscience.
Id Section 2 adds as a remedy:
That if any person or persons . . . falsely and deceitfully obtain or get into his
or their hands or possession any money, goods, chattels, jewels, or other things
of any other person or persons, by color and means of any such false token or
counffeit letter made in another man's name, as is aforesaid, that then every
person and persons so offending [shall be indictable for a misdemeanor.]
Id
71 BISHOP, supra note 70, at 107.
72 Id.; see also PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 363.
73 BISHOP, supra note 70, § 145, at 107 (citing Rex v. Bryan, 2 Stra. 866, 93 Eng.
Rep. 902 (3 Geo. 2); Hartmann v. Commonwealth., 5 Pa. 60 (1846)).
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some writing.74 A false measure, for example, qualified as a to-
ken.75 Accordingly, if a perpetrator measured out what appeared
to be a given quantity of grain to a customer, knowing the mea-
sure to be false, he committed a criminal cheat.76 The rationale
underlying the distinction between a mere lie and a false measure
was that in the case of a lie, "it [was] in everybody's power to
prevent this sort of imposition; whereas a false measure [was] a
general imposition upon the public which cannot be well discov-
ered."
7
"The cheat had to be of a public nature and such that com-
mon prudence could not guard against it."78 Accordingly, it was a
misdemeanor for a retailer to cheat a customer by using false
measures or weights79 or for an individual to obtain another's
money or property by means of a false token if the nature of such
scheme would probably affect the public at large.8° A conspiracy
to defraud was also indictable at common law.81 But, it was not
indictable for a person to obtain another's money or property by
a mere lie, or by a promise that he did not intend to perform, or
by other practices not affecting the public because these acts were
considered private fraud. 2
Blackstone treated the common law of cheat as touching
public trade because it affected the public through false weights
and measures.' Thus, according to Blackstone, a common trans-
action between two people did not give rise to a cheat. For a
cheat to be indictable, it must potentially akffect the public at large
74 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 70, § 12.30, at 840.
75 BisHop, supra note 70, § 146, at 108.
76 Id. at 108 n.15 (citing Pinkney's Case in 2 EAST, supra note 38, at 820 (Rex v.
Pinkney, 93 Eng. Rep. 58 (1732)); People v. Gates, 13 Wend. 311, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1835); Rex v. Burgaine, 82 Eng. Rep. 1185 (KB. 1669); Commonwealth v. Warren, 6
Mass. 74 (1809).
77 Id. at 108 (quoting Rex v. Osborn, 97 Eng. Rep. 1052 (KB. 1765)).
78 CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 70, § 12.30, at 838.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 838 n.41 (citing Reg. v. Mackarty, 92 Eng. Rep. 280 (Q.B. 1705) (also dis-
cussed in 2 EAST, supra note 38, at 823); Commonwealth. v. Warren, 6 Mass. 74 (1809);
People v. Arnstein, 105 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1914)).
82 Id. at 888 n.42 (citing People v. Garnett, 35 Cal. 470 (1868); State v. Renick, 56
P. 275 (Or. 1899); Middleton v. State, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 275 (S.C. CL App. 1838)).
83 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 102, 157. "Blackstone's Commentaries are
accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the common law of England." Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904). As such, his views had great influence in the de-
velopment of law in the United States. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF
THE LAW 3-4 (1941).
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and not merely a single individual.' It was indictable to perpe-
trate a conspiracy to defraud' as this would potentially affect the
public, but mere face-to-face misrepresentation would only affect a
single individual.
This distinction between affecting public versus individual
interests is well-illustrated in Rex v. Wheatley,86 in which a brewer
was indicted for cheat. He delivered sixteen gallons of beer as
though there were eighteen gallons. He was paid for the eighteen
gallons. Holding that this was not an indictable offense, Lord
Mansfield explained:
[T]hat the fact here charged should not be considered as
an indictable offense, but left to a civil remedy by an action, is
reasonable and right in the nature of the thing: because it is
only an inconvenience and injury to a private person, arising
from that private person's own negligence and carelessness in
not measuring the liquor, upon receiving it, to see whether it
held out the just measure or not.
The offense that is indictable must be such a one as af-
fects the public: As if a man uses false weights and measures,
and sells by them to all or to many of his customers, or uses
them in the general course of his dealing: so, if a man de-
frauds another, under false tokens. For these are deceptions
that common care and prudence are not sufficient to guard
against. So, if there be a conspiracy to cheat: for ordinary care
and caution is no guard against this.
Those cases are much more than mere private injuries;
they are public offenses. But here it is a mere private imposi-
tion or deception: no false weights or measures are used; .no
false tokens given; no conspiracy; only an imposition upon the
person he was dealing with, in delivering him a less quantity
instead of a greater; which the other carelessly accepted. It is
only a non-performance of his contract, for which non-perfor-
mance, he may bring his action.'7
84 CLARK & MARSHALL supra note 70, at 838 ('The cheat had to be of a public na-
ture and such that common prudence could not guard against it.").
85 Id
86 97 Eng. Rep. 746 (ILB. 1761); see also Reg. v. Jones, 91 Eng. Rep. 330 (Q.B.
1705) ("[W]e are not to indict one man for making a fool of another; let him bring his
action.").
87 97 Eng. Rep. at 748.
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D. False Pretenses
Because the larceny laws focused on possession, and common-
law cheat required a token, the law failed to provide adequate
remedies in the case of the misappropriation of property obtained
by lies, particularly because market transactions were gradually
moving from the personal to the impersonal.'
In this transformation of the economic organization of Eng-
land... four stages are usually distinguished. In the Middle
Ages goods were produced by individuals, their families and
neighbors, for local consumption. Next came regulation and
close supervision by crafts and gilds in villages and small towns.
This was still rather largely a primary group organization until
the modern period set in. Then came a period of individual
and group production, but with an increasing trend toward
large scale marketing. And ... with the Industrial Revolution,
came large scale production.'s
Hence, Parliament had to remedy this inadequacy by passing a
statute to prohibit obtaining property by false pretenses. 0 This
eighteenth century English statute, in pertinent part, stated:
[w]hereas divers evil-disposed persons, to support their
profligate way of life, have various subtle stratagems, threats
and devices, fraudulently obtained divers sums of money,
goods .... all persons who knowingly and designedly, by false
pretence or pretences, shall obtain from any person or persons,
money, goods, wares, or merchandizes, with intent to cheat or
defraud any person or persons of the same ... shall be
deemed offenders .... 91
88 HALL, supra note 18, at 25.
89 Id. (citations omitted).
90 An Act for the More Effectual Punishment of Persons who shall Attain, or At-
tempt to Attain, Possession of Goods or Money, by False or Untrue Pretenses; for Pre-
venting the Unlawful Pawning of Goods; for the Early Redemption of Goods Pawned;
and for Preventing Gaming in Public Houses by Journeymen, Labourers, Servants and
Apprentices, 1757, 30-32 Geo. 2, ch. 24 (Eng.). For a discussion of the English judges'
reluctance to extend the law in the area of larceny to include false pretenses, see MODEL
PENAL CODE § 223.1 commentary at 128-29 (1980).
91 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24.
Today, false pretenses remains a statutory crime in which there is a false representa-
tion of a material present or past fact that causes the victim to pass tide to his property
to the wrongdoer who knows his representation to be false and intends thereby to de-
fraud the victim. LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 19, § 8.7, at 739.
Although false pretense statutes vary by state, the following definition is generally
accepted across the board: 'The crime of false pretenses is knowingly and designedly oh-
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Accordingly, the elements of the offense were:
(1) an untrue representation of fact;
(2) obtainment of ownership or title;
(3) knowingly and designedly;
(4) intent to defraud; and
(5) victim actually defrauded.
92
For a defendant to be guilty of false pretenses, he had to
have made a statement that was in fact false. If he made a state-
ment that he believed to be false, but was in fact-true, no crime
was committed.93 The representation could be made orally or in
writing." A false representation typically required some form of
affirmative conduct; mere silence was generally insufficient.' Fur-
ther, the false representation had to be of a material fact.96 Tra-
ditionally, the false representation also had to relate to a present
or past fact; a false representation as to a future fact was insuf-
ficient 7 In addition, the perpetrator's misrepresentation had to
cause a bad result.9 In this context, false pretenses required that
"the victim pass title to his property in reliance upon the swindler's
misrepresentation."' Because the defendant had to obtain title to
the property, obtaining mere possession was insufficient.1' °
In contrast to the early development of larceny, false pretens-
es was, from the beginning, "an offense against ownership."
1 1'
Accordingly, title had to pass to the offender. Because the com-
mon law of larceny encompassed a case whereby possession alone
was obtained by fraud with intent to permanently deprive the
owner of his property, legislation was not needed for such a sce-
nario.0 2 It was then generally accepted that false pretenses was
not perpetrated unless the defendant obtained title or ownership
through his fraudulent scheme.
0 3
tamining the property of another by means of untrue representations of fact with intent to
defraud." PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 364.
92 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 363-89.
93 LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 19, at 740.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 740-41.
96 Id. at 741.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 744.
99 Id. (emphasis in original).
100 Id. at 745.
101 PERKINS & BOYC, supra note 20, at 374.
102 Id. at 375.
103 Id. (citing Courtney v. State, 164 So. 227 (Miss. 1935)).
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To commit false pretenses, the perpetrator must have an
"intent to defraud."' Generally, such a fraud was easily formed
in the typical swindle, but this was not always the case." 5 An in-
tent to defraud was absent where an untrue representation was
made with an intent to deceive but without the intent to obtain
the property that was obtained thereby, and without realization of
the influence of the deceit."° An omission, or silence, however,
could be considered a "deceitful means or artful practice.
" 7
"[O]ne who [knew] he [was] obtaining money or a chattel by his
misrepresentation of fact and who receive[d] it with intent to take a
fraudulent advantage of the other, has obtained it by fraud wheth-
er his original statement was made for this purpose or not."108
The silence, in light of full knowledge of the situation, was the
equivalent of a repetition of the false statement at the moment of
acquisition."° An intent to defraud was also found where the
person made an untrue statement innocently, but thereafter
learned of the mistake before the property was received and fraud-
ulently failed to disclose the information upon acquisition."
0
False pretenses further required that the victim was de-
ceived."' Property is "not obtained by the untrue representation
of fact if the real facts are known to the other. Hence it is essen-
tial to show that the owner was misled by the misrepresenta-
tion."' It was also "not an indictable offense, under the statute,
for one to obtain by false statements payment of a debt already
due, or personal property to the possession of which he [was]
entitled, because no injury [was] done.""
3
104 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 380 (citing State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35
(Utah 1980) (in reversing a conviction of "theft by deception" it was held that the in-
structions were "fatally defective" because they neglected to inform the jury that to consti-
tute the offense the obtainment must have been with "the conscious objective to with-
hold the property ...permanently.")).
105 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 380.
106 Treadwell v. State, 27 S.E. 785 (Ga. 1896).
107 Crawford v. State, 43 S.E. 762, 763 (Ga. 1903).
108 PERKINS & BO'CE, supra note 20, at 380 (citing Clarke v. People, 171 P. 69 (Colo.
(1918)).
109 PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 20, at 380-81.
110 Id. at 381.
111 Id. at 378.
112 Id. Some of the early decisions held that the crime was not committed if the
representation would not have deceived a person of ordinary prudence. See, e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Norton, 93 Mass. 266 (1865). The better rule, however, was that even "a
man who is ineffably dull may not, for that reason alone, be robbed with impunity."
Bartlett v. State, 28 Ohio St. 669, 670 (1876).
113 In re Cameron, 24 P. 90, 91 (Kan. 1890).
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II. HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF DECEIT
The common-law tort of deceit developed in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries"4 '"under the influence of the preva-
lent doctrine of 'caveat emptor. ' ' n" Caveat emptor emerged at a
time when the market primarily consisted of face-to-face buyer and
seller transactions." 6 It directed the development of "rules of
laws to its own ends."1 7 As this characterization suggests, the
philosophy of "caveat emptor" exercised great influence on the
development of the various aspects of the legal system. Caveat
emptor developed as part of the general movement away from
centuries of authoritarian controls in England." 8 The doctrine
embodies a "legal presumption of the buyer's ability to look out
for himself.""' As early as the sixteenth century, however, the
action of deceit began to emerge in the English court system.
120
114 See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster
Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End
of RICO?" 43 VAND. L. REv. 851, 910 (1990) [hereinafter Myths] ("In the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, state common-law fraud jurisprudence developed in the context of
the then prevailing philosophies of laissez faire and caveat emptor.") (footnote omitted). For
a general discussion of deceit, see MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUD AND THE
PROCEDURE PERTAINING TO THE REDRESS THEREOF ch. 1 (1877).
115 W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 108, at
751 (5th ed. 1984); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-
45 (1975) ("the typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation and
deceit evolved was light years away from the world of commercial transactions").
In contrast with the common-law tort of deceit, Congress implemented mail fraud
as a means of regulating commercial transactions. The Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934
were implemented for this same purpose. Accordingly, the relationship between the mail
fraud statute and the common law is analogous to the relationship between the securities
provisions and the common law. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983), the Court shed light on this relationship. Discussing the regulatory provisions of
securities fraud, the Court stated:
[T]he antifraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with com-
mon law doctrines of fraud. Indeed, an important purpose of the federal securi-
ties statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law
protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry.
We therefore find reference to the common law in this instance unavailing.
Id. at 388-89 (footnote and citations omitted).
116 See generally Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE LJ.
1133 (1931).
117 Id. at 1135.
118 See id. at 1136-54 (discussing the history of the authoritarian controls).
119 Id. at 1135.
120 Id. at 1166. The following passage provides an insightful illustration of the legal
development:
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The English common law required that the plaintiff prove the
following elements to establish deceit:
121
(1) a material misrepresentation made by one who knew it was
false or recklessly believed it to be true;
(2) an intention by the one who made it to induce the person
to whom it was addressed to act in some way;
(3) the deceit of the person to whom it was made and his
inducement to act; and
(4) the person to whom it was made suffered damage as a re-
sult.
12
The fraudulent misrepresentation could be achieved through
words or conduct.12 It had to be made with knowledge of its
falsehood or at least with reckless disregard as to its truth.2
The "passive acquiescence of the seller in the self deception of the
buyer" did not give rise to a cause of action for deceit.
125
A suit for the recovery of the value of a worthless bezoar stone, which had been
bought in all good faith, became in the fulness [sic] of time the foundation of
the common law rule of warranty. The disappointed purchaser brought an action
on the case against the seller for deceit. The King's Bench gave a judgment in
his favor, but in the Exchequer, on appeal, all the barons save Anderson were
of opinion that a warranty by the goldsmith and an allegation that he knew the
jewel was not what it was affirmed to be were necessary to a cause of action.
The judges added that the warranty must be made at the time of the sale. The
dissenter regarded the act of selling the precious stone for what it was not as
enough to establish deceit. Thereupon a new writ was sued out; it was, with
quaint propriety, set down that the seller, knowing it was not good, but a false
and fictitious stone, asserted it to be good and sold it to the buyer who was
ignorant of the goodness thereof. The attorneys for the purchaser urged that an
action for deceit lay if the vendor affirmed more than was true of his wares; the
opposing counsel plead the necessity for express warranty and invoked caveat
emptor. As to whether the source of the deceit lay in the seller's conscious mis-
representation or in the credulity of the buyer, the court divided. It was, howev-
er, admitted by all that if sciens le defendant were omitted, the plaintiff could not
recover. Although a casual reference in a later report records the buyer's victory,
the result is left in doubt.
Id. at 1166-67 (footnotes omitted).
121 English literature interchangeably uses the terms fraud and deceit. When used in
the context of tort and contract law, the discussion of fraud at this time period is con-
sidered synonymous with deceit. See, e.g., 2 ODGERS & ODGERS, supra note 16, at 720-21
(interchanging terms fraud and deceit).
122 Id. at 720.
123 Id.
124 Id. (citations omitted).
f25 Id. (citing Smith v. Hughes, 6 Law Report 597, 603 (Q.B. 1871) (Cockburn,
Cd.)).
[Vol. 68:33
NOTE-MAIL FRAUD, RICO, AND JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE
The philosophy of caveat emptor also "triumphed" in early
American law.12 This period in American history was character-
ized by a scarcity of capital; government, too, was not equipped
with modem-day revenue raising mechanisms. Absent such means
to subsidize emerging economic development, legal theories devel-
oped to shift the cost of economic development from the entre-
preneur to the investor and employee. 127 By the end of the eigh-
teenth century, the American legal system also became involved in
the process of encouraging economic development by granting
corporate charters and franchises to private investors.
12 s
Today, the modem law of fraud still parallels its English com-
mon-law background. The plaintiff must demonstrate the following
elements:
(1) a false representation made by the defendant, generally
one of fact;
(2) knowledge or belief by defendant that the representation is
false or defendant does not have a sufficient basis of informa-
tion to make the representation;
(3) intent to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from
action;
(4) justifiable reliance; and
(5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from such reliance.
1'29
A plaintiff could not obtain relief for deceit for the nonper-
formance of a promise s3 or for other future statements. 31 Fi-
nally, a plaintiff had to prove justifiable reliance in order to have
a legitimate cause of action.
13 2
The courts do not award nominal damages in an action for
fraud.3" Despite the degree of the defendant's deception, the
plaintiff can only recover if he is worse off for the misrepresenta-
126 Hamilton, supra note 116, at 1178.
127 The doctrine of contributory negligence, the fellow servant rule, and the power
of eminent domain also developed during this time period as means to externalize the
costs of modern development. See eg., MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 63-108 (1977) (discussing the subsidization of economic
growth through the legal system in the eighteenth century).
128 Id. at 109.
129 KEETON ET At., supra note 115, § 105, at 728; see also Atlas Pile Driving Co. v.
Dicon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (listing the elements of fraudulent
representation). See generally BIGELOW, supra note 114.
130 BIGELOW, supra note 114, at 11-12 (references omitted).
131 Id. at 12 (reference omitted).
132 KEETON Er AL., supra note 115, § 108, at 750-53.
133 S&e id. § 110, at 765 (citations omitted).
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tion.' 4 Nevertheless, when restitution is sought the courts follow
a more lenient policy." Two measures of damages are used. 3 6
The majority of jurisdictions use the "loss-of-bargain" rule, which
awards the plaintiff the benefit of what he was promised and al-
lows recovery for the difference between the actual value of What
was received and the value of what was represented. 3 7 A minori-
ty of jurisdictions adopt the "out-of-pocket" measure138 This rule
considers the loss the plaintiff has suffered in the transaction.
3 9
Accordingly, it awards the difference between the value of what
the plaintiff parted with and the value of what he received.
40
The minority rule reflects the traditional purpose of tort remedies
as it compensates the plaintiff for his actual injury rather than
awarding him for his prospective loss.' 41 In addition to these
measures of general damages, the plaintiff may recover punitive
damages, if the fraud is determined to be deliberate or wan-
ton.
142
The burden of proof in fraud litigation is clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 14 On a continuum of difficulty, the clear and con-
vincing standard falls between the lesser preponderance of the
evidence standard and the greater beyond a reasonable doubt
standard. Courts of equity, it is said, developed the clear and con-
vincing standard when confronting claims unenforceable at law
because of the Statute of Wills, the Statute of Frauds, or the pa-
role evidence rule.144 Fearful that innovative plaintiffs would fab-
134 Id.
135 Id. The lenity principle is used because the purpose here is to restore what the
defendant has received rather than to compensate the plaintiff's loss. Thus, the court
focuses on the inequity of permitting the defendant to retain it rather than the damage
which the plaintiff has sustained.
136 Id. at 767. In some situations, a third measure, disgorgement, is followed. See, e.g.,
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); see also
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
137 Id. at 768.
138 Id. at 767-68; see e.g., Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 129-30 (1889).
The measure of damage adopted under mail fraud and RICO is not uniform. Com-
pare Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1300-01 (6th Cir. 1989) ("amounts actually
invested") with Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1310 n.8 (7th Cir. 1987) (con-
tract damages, not market value, proper).
139 KEETON ET Al, supra note 115, § 110, at 767-68 (citations omitted).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 769.
143 In contrast, a typical civil suit for money damages requires that the plaintiff meet
the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
423 (1979).
144 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388 n.27 (1983) (citing Note,
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ricate claims in equity to avoid restrictions at law, the English
courts adopted the clear and convincing standard to circumscribe
frivolous claims.14 This higher standard of proof is widely ac-
cepted.46
English judges and their American counterparts thus formulat-
ed the elements of the common-law tort of deceit and the clear
and convincing standard of proof to emphasize the plaintiff's "du-
ty" to protect himself and be wary of his seller. 4 ' "It was as-
sumed that anyone may be expected to overreach another in a
bargain if he can, and that only a fool will expect common hones-
ty. Therefore, the plaintiff must make a reasonable investigation,
and form his own judgement.",
4 1
III. DEVELOPMENT OF MAIL FRAUD
IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Just as inadequacies in the law of larceny gave rise to embez-
zlement and false pretense, inadequacies in the law of fraud gave
rise to the enactment of the mail fraud statute. Indeed, mail fraud
is the culmination of a long historical progression. Seen in the
light of this history, it is clear that the congressional drafters pur-
posely took elements from older offenses, while purposely leaving
other elements out. The victim of larceny, embezzlement, or false
pretense had to suffer a property loss. Mail fraud does not require
Appellate Review in the Federal Cours of Findings Requiring More than a Preponderance of the
Evidence, 60 HARV. L. REV. 111, 112 (1946)).
145 Id. at 388 n.27.
146 The Supreme Court explained:
We take the general doctrine to be, that when in a court of equity it is pro-
posed to set aside, to annul or to correct a written instrument for fraud or
mistake in the execution of the instrument itself, the testimony on which this is
done must be clear, unequivocal, and convincing, and that it cannot be done
upon a bare preponderance of evidence which leaves the issue in doubt.
Id. (citing United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1897)); see also
Southern Dev. Co. v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247, 249-50 (1888); Colorado Coal Co. v. United
States, 123 U.S. 307, 316-19 (1887); Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887).
The burden of proof, however, under RICO is a preponderance. Sedima, S. P. R.
L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank, 815 F.2d 522,
530-32 (9th Cir. 1987) (private case); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th
Cir. 1974) (government case), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). See generally Leigh Ann
MacKenzie, Note, Civil RICO: Prior Ciminal Conviction and Burden of Proof 60 NoTRE
DAME L. REV. 566 (1985). The securities statutes are also enforced under a preponder-
ance standard. Huddeston, 459 U.S. at 383-90.
147 Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 388 n.27.
148 Id
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such loss. Common-law cheat required a token. Although mail
fraud does not require such a token, this concept was reflected in
the federal statute's case law evolution. The requirements of com-
mon-law cheat could be met by a conspiracy to defraud. The con-
gressional drafters of mall fraud deliberately substituted the con-
cept of "scheme." The drafters also retained the element of "in-
tent to defraud" required by false pretenses. Therefore, because
the drafters omitted both misrepresentation and reliance, neither
should be invariably required. Accordingly, mail fraud is best seen
as a modem form of common-law cheat.
Proposed in the 1870s by representative John Franklin
Farnsworth of Illinois'4 9 as a revision of the postal code, the mall
fraud statute, now codified at section 1341,50 originally stated:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either
opening or intending to open correspondence or communica-
tion with any other person (whether resident within or outside
of the United States), by means of the post-office establishment
of the United States, or by inciting such other person to open
communication with the person so devising or intending, shall,
in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting so
to do), place any letter or packet in any post-office of the Unit-
ed States, or take or receive any therefrom, such person, so
misusing the post-office establishment, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment, as
the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar months.
The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge
offences to the number of three when committed within the
same six calendar months; but the court thereupon shall give a
single sentence, and shall proportion the punishment especially
to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office establish-
ment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and
device.
151
The original congressional committee, appointed in 1866,152 set
out merely to revise the postal laws. l"3 It accomplished far more.
As finally drafted, the statute had as its purpose to prevent the use
149 DICrIoNARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 284-85 (1930).
150 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 1991).
151 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
152 Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting The Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20
AM. CRIM. L REv. 423, 423-24 (1983).
153 Id. at 424 (referencing Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat 74).
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of the U.S. Postal Service in the facilitation of a wide range of
fraudulent schemes. 54  Speaking for the bill, Congressman
Farnsworth stated that the legislation was designed "to prevent the
frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities... by
thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purposes of
deceiving and fleecing the innocent people in the country."'55
Curiously, the statute did not give rise to much congressional
debate, and it occasioned little explanatory legislative history.5
In fact, the statute was one of a series of federal statutes born
in the Reconstruction era immediately after the Civil War.15 7 The
mail fraud statute is best seen as part of a' broader process of
developing governmental activity to regulate and promote the
economy that built on, but did not merely codify, the English
common law.158 These legal forces were driven by the demands
of the national market system.'59 As such, Reconstruction legisla-
tion moved sharply away from the strict philosophy of caveat emp-
tor. For example, in 1868, Congress first enacted the lottery
law." The law stated that it was illegal to mail matter "concern-
ing [illegal] lotteries, so-called gift concerts, or other similar en-
terprises offering prizes of any kind on any pretext whatever."
6'
Two years later Congress further expanded criminal jurisdiction
over the use of the mails with the enactment of the Comstock
Act,162 which broadened the approach of the lottery law to reach
obscenity. In keeping with this congressional theme of regulation,
Congress thus passed the mail fraud statute to forbid the use of
154 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) ("In so far as the sparse legis-
lative history reveals anything, it indicates that the original impetus behind the mail fraud
statute was to protect the people from schemes to deprive them of their money or prop-
erty."); Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960); Diirland v. United States, 161
U.S. 306, 314 (1896).
155 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870).
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See, eg., OscAR HANDLUN & MARY F. HANDuN, COMMONWEALTH, A ST-DY OF THE
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY' MASSACHUSETTS, 1744-1861 (1969);
Louis HARTZ, ECONOMIC POucY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860
(1948).
159 HORwrrz, supra note 127, at 101.
160 Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 196.
161 Id.
162 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 148, 17 Stat. 302. The Act criminalized "the mail-
ing of any 'obscene . . . vulgar or indecent book, pamphlet, picture, print' or publica-
tion, as well as any envelope or postal card on which was written or printed any 'scurri-
lous epithets' or 'disloyal devices.'" Rakoff, supra note 15, at 782.
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the mails for the purpose of carrying on "any scheme or artifice
to defraud."16 In sharp contrast to its historical antecedents, the
mail fraud statute, therefore, was enacted during the ascendancy
of a philosophy that increasingly deviated from caveat emptor:
"[T]here existed a perceived need for federal intervention to dis-
pel widespread fraud.""6
After its enactment, two schools of thought on the interpreta-
tion of the statute developed. The first school of thought, the
"strict constructionists," narrowly interpreted the statute by focus-
ing on its mail emphasizing language. 65  United States v.
Owens" is an early illustration of this approach. In Owens, the
defendant owed a distillery $162.50. In order to pay his bill, he
mailed a letter containing fifty cents and a letter stating that the
entire $162.50 was enclosed. The indictment alleged that the de-
fendant intentionally tried to circumvent paying the full amount
by having a clerk, relying on the letter, incorrectly credit his ac-
count. 67 The Owens court, rather than performing an elemental
analysis of the statute to decide the case," considered whether
Congress intended for such a situation to fall within the scope of
federal jurisdiction.'69 The Owens court concluded that Congress
did not intend for federal jurisdiction to extend to such trivial
matters.170 In reaching its decision, the court dissected the mail
emphasizing language of the statute, specifically emphasizing the
language related to proportioning the punishment "to the decree
in which the abuse of the post-office establishment enters as an in-
strument into the fraudulent scheme."171 The court interpreted
this language as meaning that the statute "was designed to strike
at common schemes of fraud, whereby, through the post-office,
circulars, etc., are distributed, generally to entrap and defraud the
unwary, and not the supervision of commercial correspondence
solely between a debtor and creditor."172 Thus, the court at-
tempted to limit the statute by making it applicable only to the
163 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
164 Rakoff, supra note 15, at 780.
165 Id. at 790-95.
166 17 F. 72 (E.D. Mo. 1883).
167 Id. at 73.
168 An elemental analysis would have lead to conviction since all of the elements are
present. For a discussion of the elements of the mail fraud statute, see infta Part IV.A.
169 Owen, 17 F. at 73-74.
170 Id. at 74.
171 Id. (citations omitted).
172 Id.
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type of "common scheme" supposedly intended by Congress, ig-
noring the elements of the statute reflected in its actual language.
The Owens court failed, however, to clearly define the boundaries
of "common scheme." Other strict constructionist decisions failed
to define the sort of "common scheme" supposedly falling within
the statutory prohibition.7'7 The strict constructionists used the
statute's mail emphasizing language to argue that Congress intend-
ed to limit the scope of the statute. Congress, however, amended
the statute in 1909 to remove the mail emphasizing language.
74
Because so few schemes were ever thought to meet the "common
scheme" test, the courts did not go further and define "scheme to
defraud." Thus, the concept remained largely undefined.
The second school of thought interpreted the statute from
the "broad constructionist" perspective. 75 The broad construc-
tionists stressed the federal government's intent to exercise com-
plete control over the mails.176 This school believed that the
statute's underlying congressional intent was to keep. the mails
"pure" and free from taint. 7 For example, in United States v.
Horman,178 a broad constructionist court stated:
[T]he offense defined by [the mail fraud statute] is one against
the postal laws of the United States, and the policy of this
statute is to prevent the misuse of the mails of the United
States,-the prostitution of the mails of the United States in
furtherance of dishonest schemes. The government intends that
the post-office establishment shall be used by the people for
th6 purposes of legitimate business and social intercourse and
that it shall not be used for the purpose of furthering dishon-
est schemes or practices .... 17
173 See, eg., United States v. Clark, 121 F. 190 (M.D. Pa. 1903) (dismissing an indict-
ment alleging that defendants mailed fraudulent circulars to their victims, misrepresenting
that in return for victims' money they would provide individualized instruction through
the mails and concluding that this type of scheme was not within statute's scope); United
States v. Mitchell, 36 F. 492 (W.D. Pa. 1888) (dismissing an indictment against insurance
policyholder who induced postal employee to backdate postmark on premium renewal in
order to recover for injury suffered two days after his policy had lapsed and holding this
was not type of scheme prohibited by statute).
174 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130. See infra Appendix for the
full text.
175 Rakoff, supra note 15, at 795-802.
176 Id. at 796.
177 Id.
178 118 F. 780 (S.D. Ohio 1901), aft'd, 116 F. 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 187 U.S.
641 (1902).
179 'Id. at 780-81. See infra text and accompanying notes 192-95.
1992]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Accordingly, under this perspective the type of scheme involved
was irrelevant. The schemer merely needed to make use of the
federal mails; usage alone was the gist of the crime."' 0
The earliest case employing the broad constructionist ap-
proach was United States v. Jones.' Harking back to the token of
common-law cheat, Jones involved a "green article" scheme, in
which the defendant mailed letters to persons offering to sell
them counterfeit money at a fraction of the face value thereby
enabling the purchaser to sell these to the public for a profit."8 2
The Jones court held that the mail fraud statute had been violated.
The court stated that "the gist of the offence consists in the abuse
of the mail. The corpus delicti was the mailing of the letter .....
[T]he letter itself showed its unlawful character."183
Broad constructionist courts declined to limit the statute by
imposing on it common-law fraud doctrines.8 4 In United States v.
Loring,8 5 for example, the defendants were charged with falsely
promising to invest solicited investment funds, when instead they
intended to use the funds for their own gain."8 6 Arguing for dis-
missal, defendants contended that the indictment fell short of
making a claim for fraud under the common law or state law.
8 7
The Loring court rejected this defense. The court stated:
it [is not] necessary that the scheme or artifice devised should
be in itself unlawful [under state or common law]. If the
scheme was fraudulent,-if the purpose was to get money from
other persons, under pretense of investing it for such persons,
and not so to invest it, but to apply it to the use of the defen-
dants,-the case is within the statute. The object of the law
was to prevent persons having fraudulent designs on others
from using the post office as a means of effecting such fraud.
It need not, in my opinion, be a fraud either at common law
or by statute. It is enough if it was a scheme or purpose to de-
fraud any persons of their money. Some of the states of this
Union prohibit lotteries, and make it a crime to conduct a lot-
180 Rakoff, supra note 15, at 796.
181 10 F. 469 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882).
182 Id. at 470. ("[T]he accused devised a scheme to put counterfeit money in circula-
tion by sending through the mail to one Bates a letter calculated to induce Bates to
purchase counterfeit money at a low price, for the purpose of putting it off as good.").
183 Id.
184 Rakoff, supra note 15, at 799.
185 91 F. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1884).
186 Id. at 884.
187 Id. at 882.
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tery; others legalize lotteries, and give them their affirmative
legislation and sanction, for the support of public enterprises,
or for the purpose of private gain; and yet all matter concern-
ing lotteries whether legal or illegal, is by law excluded from
the mail. It is a misdemeanor to place such matter in the post
office; and that has been held to be a constitutional law.18
The broadest application of the mail fraud statute under the
broad constructionist approach was its application of mail fraud to
blackmail schemes. Weeber v. United States"a9 was the first black-
mail case using the statute. In trying to collect a debt from a third
party, Weeber sent a false letter through the mails containing a
fictitious request from the federal prosecutor for information from
Weeber from the third party. Pretending that the third party was
under investigation, Weeber tried to use the letter against the
third party as a means of blackmail for collecting the debt. While
this would not be considered a violation of the statute under a
strict constructionist view,1" the Weeber court held that his con-
duct fell within the scope of the statute; according to Weeber, the
mailing need not be "essential" to the scheme, but merely a "con-
venient step" in the scheme.' 9'
In United States v. Horman,"9 a broad constructionist court
further extended the application of mail fraud in blackmail prose-
cutions. Horman used the mails to send letters to three victims
threatening' them that unless they paid him $7,000 he would ex-
pose knowledge he had about scandalous crimes to the newspa-
pers and the community. 9 The indictment alleged a false repre-
sentation because Horman did not actually have any knowledge of
scandalous crimes.' The Horman court held that any blackmail
scheme was a "scheme to defraud" for purposes of the statute
188 Id. at 887; see also Harris v. Rosenberger, 145 F. 449, 458 (8th Cir.) (inducing
purchases through false representations falls within statute even if victims in fact receive
fair market value for their money), cert. denieA 203 U.S. 591 (1906); O'Hara v. United
States, 129 F. 551, 555 (6th Cir. 1904) (fact that it is self-evident that scheme is impossi-
ble to execute does not take it out of the statute's coverage); United States v. Bernard,
84 F. 634, 635 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898) (obtaining money by false representations as to profits
violates the statute even though the money is then properly invested for the benefit of
those who remit it).
189 62 F. 740 (C.C.D. Colo. 1894).
190 The use of the mails was not essential to the scheme.
191 Weeber, 62 F. at 741.
192 118 F. 780 (S.D. Ohio 1901), af'd, 116 F. 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 187 U.S.
641 (1902).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 781.
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irrespective of the existence of an element of deception. The
Horman court emphasized the "policy of [the mail fraud statute],
and the broad purposes it was intended to serve, in preventing the
prostitution of the mails of the United States in furtherance of
dishonest schemes or practices of any kind ....
The Supreme Court adopted the "broad constructionist" per-
spective of the statute in Durland v. United States.196 In Durland,
the defendant designed a bond scheme which promised payment
of future bond maturation in exchange for purchase of the bonds
through an installment contract.1 97 In his defense, Durland tried
to limit the statutory prohibition with concepts drawn from the
common-law false pretenses, which required the misrepresentation
of a past fact. 9 Thus, because his scam referred to future pay-
ments, he argued that his representations merely constituted an
intent to breach a contract. 99 In spite of the defendant's argu-
ment, the Court held that the mail fraud statute extended to "rep-
resentations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises
as to the future.""0 The Durland Court stated:
It was with the purpose of protecting the public against all
such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post
office from being used to carry them into effect, that this stat-
ute was passed; and it would strip it of value to confine it to
such cases as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some
existing fact, and exclude those in which is only the allurement
of a specious and glittering promise.
201
Thus, the Court ended the debate between the broad and strict
constructionist schools. The Durland Court held that a scheme to
195 Id. at 782.
196 161 U.S. 306 (1896). Congress, too, responded to the controversy between the
differing approaches by amending the original text of the statute in 1889 and adopting
the broad constructionist view. The amended version specifically included schemes involv-
ing "'spurious coin, bank notes, paper money ...or any scheme or artifice to 6btain
money . . .by what is commonly called the "sawdust swindle," . . . "green cigars," or any
other names or terms intended to be understood as relating to such counterfeit or spuri-
ous articles . . . .'" Hurson, supra note 152, at 427 (citing Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393,
§1, 25 Stat. 873); see also Hurson, supra note 152, at 427 n.32 (explaining that this lan-
guage was removed in 1948 because it had become "obsolete"); see infra Appendix, for
the statute's full text.
197 Durland, 161 U.S. at 307-08.
198 Id at 312; see supra Part I.D.
199 Durland, 161 U.S. at 313-14.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 314. Compare this rationale with the rationale expressed by Lord Mansfield,
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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defraud under the statute and common-law fraud were two sepa-
rate concepts. 2° 2 The opinion argued that the statute would be
ineffectual if it were limited by false pretenses.25 The Court rec-
ognized that nothing was more enticing to human nature than the
expectation of receiving large returns on small investments and
that any scheme or plan that held out the prospect of receiving
more than was parted with would appeal to everyone.
Following the Durland decision, Congress amended the statute
again in 1909 and eliminated any remaining "mail emphasizing"
language. 201 It also codified the Durland result, and it specifically
removed the second statutory element. The statute no longer re-
quired that the scheme to defraud be intended to be effected
through use of the mails. Indeed, after this revision, the use of
the mails became strictly a jurisdictional element rather than an
essential part of the scheme.
The Supreme Court returned to the statute in its modem
form in United States v. Young."° Young mailed tainted financial
statements exaggerating the success of his company to New York
brokers.2 "u Based on the fraudulent statements, the brokers rec-
ommended that banks and other companies lend money to
Young's company in exchange for negotiable notes. 2 7 The Court
held that the elements of mail fraud were twofold. First, a scheme
to defraud must be present. Second, the defendant must place a
202 Dur/and, 161 U.S. at 312-13.
203 Id. at 314.
204 Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130. The newly amended statute
stated in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations,, or promises . . . shall, for the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed,
any letter, postal card, package, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement,
whether addressed to any person residing within or outside the United States, in
any post-office; or station thereof, or street or other letter box of the United
States, or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the
post-office establishment of the United States, or shall take or receive any such
therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United States ..... shall be
fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
Id.; see infta Appendix, for the full text.
205 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
206 Id. at 156-57.
207 Id. at 157.
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letter in the postal service for the purpose of executing the
scheme.
208
This string of late nineteenth and early twentieth century
decisions amply demonstrates that the statute's text and legislative
purpose transcends its common-law antecedents. Its most recent
amendment?' also shows Congress' continuing purpose not to
permit the reach of the mail fraud statute to be circumscribed.
Mail fraud developed in response to the "growth of a national
economy"210 and "a concomitant growth in large-scale swindles,
get-rich-quick schemes, and financial frauds."211 "During the past
century, both Congress and the Supreme Court have repeatedly
placed their stamps of approval on expansive use of the mail
fraud statute. Indeed, each of the five legislative revisions of the
statute has served to enlarge its coverage."
21 2
IV. THE MISREPRESENTATION OF
"SCHEME TO DEFRAUD"
A. The Elements of Mail Fraud
The essential elements of the mail fraud offense are:
(1) a scheme to defraud,
(2) intent to defraud, and
208 Id. at 161. Two years after Young, the Court in Badders v. United States, 240 U.S.
391 (1916), held that the mail fraud statute was not beyond the power of Congress as a
means of combatting fraud. The Court reasoned that:
The overt act of putting a letter into the postoffice of the United States is a
matter that Congress may regulate. Whatever the limits to its power, [Congress]
may forbid any such acts done in furtherance of a scheme that it regards as
contrary to public policy, whether it can forbid the scheme or not. Intent may
make an otherwise innocent act criminal, if it is a step in a plot. The acts al-
leged [placing certain letters in the mail] have been found to have been done
for the purpose of executing the scheme, and there would be no ground for
contending, if it were argued, that they were too remotely connected with the
scheme for the law to deal with them. The whole matter is disposed of by Unit-
ed States v. Young. As to the other point, there is no doubt that the law may
make each putting of a letter into the postoffice a separate offence.
Id. at 393-94 (citations omitted). The Court's use of the term "regulate" illustrates the
regulatory influence underlying the mail fraud statute. See also Parr v. United States, 363
U.S. 370, 389-91 (1960) (recognizing the Badders line of reasoning).
209 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 1992) (promulgated Nov. 18, 1988); see supra note 10; see
also infta Appendix, for the full text.
210 Rakoff, supra note 15, at 780.
211 Id. (citations omitted).
212 Id. at 772. The number of revisions now is of course six. See infi note 10 (dis-
cussing 18 U.S.C. § 1346). See infra Appendix, for a collection of these amendments.
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(3) use of the mails.
213
"The aim of the mail and wire fraud statutes is to punish the
scheme to defraud rather than the end result."2 14 Accordingly,
the statute does not require that the victim of the scheme actually
lose money or property.
2 15
1. Scheme to Defraud
The first'element, a scheme to defraud, is interpreted broadly.
It includes any form of "trick, deceit, chicane or overreach-
ing."21 6 Illustrating the broad scope of fraud, the Eighth Circuit
in Isaacs v. United States observed:
21 7
[W]e recognize that the forms of fraud are as multifarious as
human ingenuity can devise; that courts consider it difficult, if
not impossible, to formulate an exact, definite and all-inclusive
definition thereof; and that each case must be determined on
its own facts. In general, and in its generic sense, fraud com-
prises all acts, conduct, omissions and concealment involving
breach of a legal or equitable duty and resulting in damage to
another.
21 8
Building on the broad interpretation of fraud, the statute is ap-
plied to land sale schemes,21 advance fee rackets, 220 schemes
213 See, eg., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954) (defendant convicted under
§ 1341 for causing a letter to be mailed by a bank pursuant to a scheme to defraud a
wealthy widow); United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1986) (unsuc-
cessful scheme to defraud government with mails pursuant to marijuana import scheme);
see also Morley v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1989) ('The offenses of mail and
wire fraud require use of the mails or wires coupled with an intent to defraud."). See
generally 1 CORNELL INSTrrUTE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, TECHNIQUES IN THE INvESTIGATION
AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON RICO 120-53 (G. Robert Blakey
ed., 1980) [hereinafter CORNELL].
214 United States v. Sanders, 893 F.2d 133, 138 (7th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
215 Id.; see also George v. Blue Diamond Petroleum, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 539, 550 (W.D.
La. 1989).
. 216 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (quoting McNally v. United States,
483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188
(1924))). See generally United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1991) (trick-
ing bank into allowing former employee to continue to use key card that permitted ac-
cess to confidential information that, in turn, permitted insider trading is "scheme to
defraud"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1564 (1992); United States v. Coyle, 943 F.2d 424, 427
(4th Cir. 1991) (manufacture and advertisement of device to cheat cable companies is
'scheme to defraud," even though concept may be broader than common-law fraud).
217 301 F.2d 706 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962).
218 IL at 713 (citation omitted).
219 See eg., United States v. AMREP Corp., 560 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1977),. cerL denied
434 U.S. 1015 (1978); Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1967), cerL denied
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to defraud investors,22' schemes to defraud insurance compa-
nies, 2  merchandising schemes, 223  securities" frauds, 224  tax
frauds,2 5  planned bankruptcy schemes, 226  debt' consolidation
schemes,22 7  credit card schemes,
228  chain referral schemes,229
schemes involving false applications or statements to obtain credit
or loans, 2 0  franchise schemes,
231 work-at-home schemes,23
2
correspondence school schemes, 23 3  check-kiting, 23 4  marital
schemes,235  divorce mills, 236 charitable frauds,237  and forms of
false advertising.28 Broadly, the decisions describe "scheme to
defraud" as a deviation from "moral uprightness, fundamental
honesty, fair play and right dealing [as] the general business life
of members of society. " 231 These courts use general language to
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
220 See, e.g., United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962); United States v. Kaplan,
554 F.2d 958 (9th Cir.), cet. denied, 434 U.S. 956 (1977); Gusow v. United States, 347
F.2d 755 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 906 (1965).
221 See, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1069 (1987).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Candoli, 870 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1989).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Press, 336 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
965 (1965); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, rehg den., 490 U.S 1076
(1989) (odometer turnback scheme).
224 See, e.g., United States v. Sparrow, 470 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 936 (1973).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 545 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 930 (1977); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420
U.S. 973 (1975).
226 See, e.g., Jacobs v. United States, 395 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1968).
227 See, e.g., United States v. Bertin, 254 F. Supp. 937 (D. Md. 1966).
228 See e.g., United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974); Parr v. United States, 363
U.S. 370 (1960).
229 See, eg., Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967).
230 See, e.g., United States v. Young, 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
231 See, e.g., Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1964) (mail order fran-
chise), crt., denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965).
232 See, e.g., United States v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962).
233 See, e.g., Babson v. United States, 330 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964).
234 See, e.g., United States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618 (l1th Cir.), cot. denied; 111 S. Ct.
305 (1990); Williams v. United States, 278 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1960).
235 See, eg., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
236 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
891 (1972).
237 See, e.g., Koolish v. United States, 340 F.2d 513 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
951 (1965).
238 See, eg., United States v. Chavis, 772 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1985).
239 United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S
896 (1978).
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define scheme to defraud by focusing on breaches of duty of
honesty or loyalty.
240
The "moral uprightness" or "nontechnical standard" is well-
illustrated in Gregory v. United States.241 In Gregory, the defendant,
a postal worker, and his wife devised a scheme to fix postmarks on
entries for a football contest. The defendant used the postmark to
make entries look timely when in reality the entries had been
completed after the football games. The Gregory court stated, "[a
scheme to defraud] is a reflection of moral uprightness, of funda-
mental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general and
business life of memflers of society."242 The courts apply this the-ory in a wide variety of contexts.243
240 See United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1982) (defendants in-
dicted for RICO with a predicate act of mail fraud, the court stated that mail fraud
claims are not limited to tangible interests), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United
States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1980) (court holds that a
salesman/trader of government bonds breached his duty to provide faithful service to
employer pursuant to a scheme to defraud; .such duties may exist in employer/employee
relationships), cet. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); United States v. Regent Office Supply
Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970) (scheme to defraud requires that deceit go to
the nature of the bargain; here a false solicitation scheme did not influence the nature
of the bargain); Henderson v. United States, 202 F.2d 400, 404 (6th Cir. 1953) (no mis-
representation of fact is necessary), crt. denied, 349 U.S. 920 (1955); Epstein v. United
States, 174 F.2d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 1949) (scheme to defraud breweries thereby hurting
stockholders; "crime of using the mails to defraud is not limited to what would give rise
to a common-law action for deceit"); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th
Cir.) (bond scheme; "there may be a scheme to defraud by other means than express
false representations"), cmt denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941); Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d
675, 681 (5th Cir.) (contract bid scheme; "[t]he law does not define fraud; it needs no
definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity"), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 687 (1941).
241 253 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1958).
242 Id. at 109.
243 Se, e.g., Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir.
1989) (scheme to defraud residential subcontractors); United States v. Bishop, 825 F.2d
1278, 1280 (8th Cir. 1987) (scheme to defraud lending institution); United States v.
Fischl, 797 F.2d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 1986) (kickback scheme); United States v. Fowler, 735
F.2d 823, 827-28 (5th Cir. 1984) (bidding scam); United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893,
897 (9th Cir. 1982) (money laundering scheme to avoid state law requiring disclosure of
contributions to state legislature), cert. denid, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v.
Shamy, 656 F.2d 951, 957 (4th Cir. 1981) (not limited to fraudulent schemes within
meaning of common law or as prohibited by state law), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982);
United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928
(1980); United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 994
(1979); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1361 (4th Cir.), afjd in rel ant part en
ban, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979), crt. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v.
States, 488 F.2d 761, 764 (8th Cir. 1973), crt. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974); Blachly v.
United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967). Panel decisions in the Seventh Circuit,
however, caution that the "moral uprightness language" cannot be taken literally, since it
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2. Intent
The second element, an intent to defraud, refers to the
defendant's state of mind. It may be broken down into two parts:
(1) intent to deprive another of something, to harm another,
or to gain a benefit for oneself; and
(2) where false statements' or omissions are involved, reckless-
ness as to the truth or falsity of representations or omissions
made in the course of the scheme.
244
Thus, the defendant must intend to deprive another of something
of value, to cause some injury to another, or to gain a benefit for
himself by means of his actions.245 "The specific intent re-
quired . . . is the intent to defraud . . . and not the intent to vio-
late a statute."246 Accordingly, because good faith negates bad
faith, good faith is a complete defense to a mail fraud prosecu-
tion.2 47 Moreover, a careful analysis of the jurisprudence under
would "put federal judges in the business of creating . . . common law crimes." United
States v. Holzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 807
(1987), on remand, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1988).
244 See CORNELL, supra note 213, at 132.
It is not necessary to have a misrepresentation to have a scheme to defraud. See,
e.g., Formax Inc. v. Hostert, 841 F.2d 388, 390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (misappropriation of
trade secrets with mail and wire fraud statutes; analysis of Carpenter v. United States, 484
U.S. 19 (1987)); Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.) ("A scheme to
get money unfairly by obtaining and then betraying the confidence of another, or by
corrupting one who acts for another . . . would be a scheme to defraud though no lies
were told."), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). See generally McLendon v. Continental
Group, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1492, 1506-10 (D.N.J. 1985) (cases collected). The McLendon
court aptly observed:
A course of conduct may comprise a scheme or artifice to defraud, even absent
particular fraudulent statements or omissions. Indeed, the statute discusses two
separate types of mail/wire fraud offenses: one may act pursuant to a "scheme
or artifice to defraud" or one may act "by means of false or fraudulent pretens-
es, representations or promises." . . . [Olther courts . . . have given the statute
such a disjunctive meaning.
Id. at 1507. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
245 See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (D. Md. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
246 United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1358 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810
(1989).
247 A showing of good faith eliminates the second element of the offense. See, e.g.,
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) (good faith negates bad faith). Hon-
est business people, therefore, should have little to fear from mail fraud prosecutions or
mall fraud based civil RICO litigation. If they are in doubt of the proper course of ac-
tion, they need only seek legal advice, as good faith may be established by reliance on
advice of counsel.
[Vol. 68:333
NOTE-MAIL FRAUD, RICO, AND JUSTIFIABLE RELIANCE
the statute demonstrates that its state of mind element is princi-
pally a negative concept, that is, the absence of good faith. 48
Further, where representations or omissions are at issue, the
defendant must be at least reckless as to the truth or falsity of
representations or omissions made in the course of the
scheme.249 Thus, the defendant need not know that his represen-
tations are false or misleading, rather his recklessness in failing to
acquire that knowledge is sufficient.
It is difficult to obtain direct proof of state of mind. Conse-
quently, the prosecutor or plaintiff must often resort to circum-
stantial evidence to prove "intent to defraud. "  For example,
248 Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 453 (1908) (prosecution for conspiracy
to subornate perjury instruction upheld on reliance on advice of counsel to establish
good faith; "[I]f a man honestly and in good faith seeks advice of a lawyer as to what
he may lawfully do . . . and fully and honestly lays all the facts before his counsel, and
in good faith and honestly follows such advice, relying upon it and believing it to be
correct, and only intends that his acts shall be lawful, he ... [can]not be convicted of
crime which involves willful and unlawful intent"); United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368,
382-83 (3d Cir.) (willfulness and advice of counsel: full disclosure on means and end),
cert. denie.d 493 U.S. 821 (1989); United States v. Poludniak, 657 F.2d 948, 958-59 (8th
Cir. 1981) (advice of counsel of good faith submitted to jury in conspiracy to extort
prosecution), crt. denied sub. nom. Weigand v. United States, 455 U.S. 940 (1982);
Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1969) (advice of counsels on
good faith submitted to jury in prosecution under the securities act), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
935 (1970).
249 United States v. Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 1983) (reckless disre-
gard), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537
(3d Cir. 1978) (willful participation with knowledge of scheme's fraudulent nature); Unit-
ed States v. Henderson, 446 F.2d 960, 966 (8th Cir.) (reckless disregard), ceut. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); Irwin v. United States, 338 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1964) (reckless indif-
ference), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 911 (1965).
The omission, or failure to disclose, need not rest on a "clear legal" duty; it is suffi-
cient if it is widely accepted in the community. United States v. Richman, 944 F.2d 323,
333 (7th Cir. 1991) (attorney paying claims adjuster and concealing payment from insur-
er); see also United States v. UCO Oil Co., 546 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The law
of fraud knows no difference between express representation . . . and implied misrepre-
sentation or concealment ... .") (quoting Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434,
437 (2d Cir. 1943)), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
250 S e.g., Aiken v. United States, 108 F.2d 182, 183 (4th Cir. 1939). The court in
Aiken discussed the circumstances from which intent could be inferred:
Fraudulent intent ... is too often difficult to prove by direct and convincing
evidence. In many cases it must be inferred from a series of seemingly isolated
acts and instances which have been rather aptly designated as badges of fraud.
When these are sufficiently numerous they may in their totality properly justify
an inference of a fraudulent intent ....
Id. The most "powerful" circumstantial evidence of fraud is an "elaborate effort" to con-
ceal activity. United States v. Olson, 925 F.2d 1170, 1176 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 170 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 838 (1985)); see
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intent to deprive or harm another or to benefit oneself may be in-
ferred from evidence of an actual deprivation, a harm inflicted, or
a benefit gained.251 In addition, the converse is true. "[T]he fail-
ure to benefit from a scheme ... may mirror the defendant's
good faith."252
The most significant source of circumstantial evidence is the
defendant's conduct in the execution of the scheme. Accordingly,
the prosecutor or plaintiff may bring in evidence of deceptive con-
duct, such as false or misleading representations 253 or nondisclo-
sure or concealment of material facts,254 from which the jury
may infer an "intent to defraud."
When considering circumstantial evidence, however, the courts
impose limits. For example, if a misrepresentation is involved, it
must relate to what is bargained for to be evidence of "intent to
defraud," 211 or more simply stated, the defrauder must deceive
his victim as to the quality or nature of the deal. Thus, a misrep-
resentation concerning trivial or extraneous matters is not suffi-
cient.21' A showing that a seller is merely boasting about the
also United States v. Lanier, 838 F.2d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1988) (fraudulent loan scheme);
United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102 (8th Cir.) (brokerage scheme), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 858 (1986); United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1985) ("evi-
dence . . . that would allow the jury to infer the existence of a fraudulent scheme");
United States v. Stephens, 779 F.2d 232, 235-36 (9th Cir. 1985) (secret bank account);
United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 841 n.4 (9th Cir.) (land fraud), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 944 (1972).
251 United States v. Meyer, 359 F.2d 837, 839-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 837
(1966).
252 Id. at 840.
253 Although misrepresentations relating to intentions as to future acts were not sub-
ject to prosecution at common law, see supra Part I, this restriction does not limit sec-
tion 1341. The Supreme Court made this clear in Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306
(1896). The Court stated, "[the mail fraud statute] includes everything designed to de-
fraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions or promises as to the
future." Id. at 313.
254 Nondisclosure and concealment most commonly arise in political corruption cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
255 See United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 543-44 (3d Cir. 1978); United States
v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970).
256 For example, in Pear/stein, the appellants were salesmen for GMF/Elgin Pen. As
part of their sales pitch directed to potential distributorship purchasers, the salesmen ex-
aggerated their roles in the company's operation and misrepresented their personal busi-
ness backgrounds. The court held that "such misrepresentations did not relate to the
essential feature of their presentations . . . and hardly can be construed as fraudulent."
576 F.2d at 544. Pearstein is distinguished in United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1381
(9th Cir. 1990) (knowledge of fraud found).
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quality of his goods during the course of his solicitation will not
suffice to establish an "intent to defraud."
257
Circumstantial evidence may also be used to establish reckless-
ness regarding the truthfulness or falsity of representations or
omissions. For example, if the schemer is put on notice of the
possibility that his claims are false and continues to make the
representations, a jury may infer his reckless disregard of their
validity- 2
8
3. Use of Mails
Finally, the third element, use of the mails, requires only that
the defendant use the mails in furtherance of his scheme. A result
is not required; the statute does not require that the scheme be
successful or completed .2 " Each use of the mails is a separate
'offense.
26
B. Mail Fraud as a RICO Predicate
The jurisprudence developing around the interrelation be-
tween mail fraud and RICO 211 litigation reflects an unwarranted
introduction of the limitations on the common-law offense of
obtaining property by false pretenses and the common-law tort of
deceit. In particular, an inflexible requirement of justifiable reli-
ance excludes meritorious litigants from RICO recovery. Durland v.
257 See generally United States v. Simon, 839 F.2d 1461, 1467-68 (11th Cir.) (discussion
or difference between puffery and fraud), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861 (1988); John B.
Grimball, Mail FraudFraudulent Misrepresentations Must Be Distinguished from "Puffing" or
"Sellers Talk" in Offenses Under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 22 S.C. L. REV. 434 (1970).
258 Simon, 839 F.2d at 1470; United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676, 679 (1st Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907 (1988); United States v. Federbush, 625 F.2d 246, 255
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1358-59 (9th Cir.) (reckless-
ness established as to one defendant, but not the other), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830
(1978); United States v. Press, 336 F.2d 1003, 1011 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
965 (1965).
259 Durland, 161 U.S. at 315; United States v. Utz, 886 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.
1989); Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 673 (5th Cir. 1967).
260 See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).
261 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. III 1991 & Supp. 1992). See generally Myths,
supra note 114; G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Re-
flections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only
Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NoTRE DAME L REV. 526 (1987); G. Robert Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context. Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
237 (1982); G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009 (1980)
[hereinafter Blakey & Gettings].
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United State?62 held that "scheme to defraud" is not circum-
scribed by common-law limitations. As such, some courts rightly
recognize the impropriety of introducing a reliance requirement
into the jurisprudence of civil RICO claims predicated on mail
fraud.26 In spite of this, however, a trend is emerging in other
courts to employ the requirement of reliance to deny recovery
under RICO.2"
When mail fraud is used as the predicate offense in a civil
RICO context, all that ought to be required to establish the sub-
stantive elements of the violation are the mail fraud elements (a
"scheme to defraud," intent to defraud and the use of the mails)
and the other usual RICO elements. 265  Under RICO's remedial
provisions," the Attorney General2 6 7 or "any person injured in
262 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
263 See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1139 (5th cir. 1988) (This case
involved a default on municipal revenue bonds, and an alleged fraudulent failure to de-
scribe the nature of a property acquisition benefitting a promoter. The jury verdict was
upheld. Materiality and reliance are not required to prove the mail fraud predicate acts.
"Since reliance is not an element of the class's RICO claims, it follows that the proof of
its damages which the class presented suffices to show that [defendants] caused measur-
able RICO damages . . . ."); Rosario v. Livaditis, No. 87-C 1224 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 1988)
(class action for fraudulent sale of courses in cosmetology); Kempe v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., No. 86-891 (E.D. La. May 14, 1987) (In response to defendant's state-
ment that reliance is not alleged as required, the court noted that the RICO claim turns
not on the tort of fraud, but rather on a pattern of racketeering comprising various acts
of mail and wire fraud "for which the issue of reliance is entirely irrelevant." On motion
for class certification, the court noted that defendants were wrong in their assertion that
individual reliance must be shown. Reliance is not an element of mall fraud.).
264 See, e.g., Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 747
(2d Cir. 1992) ("The causation analysis encompasses two related, yet distinct ele-
ments-reliance and causation-elements that, in effect, correspond respectively with com-
mon law notions of 'but for' and proximate causation.") (citations omitted).
265 RICO prohibits a person from:
1. using income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an in-
terest in an enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988).
2. acquiring or maintaining an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1988).
3. conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
4. conspiring to commit any of these offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Supp.
1992).
See generaly Blakey & Gettings, supra note 261, at 1021-48.
266 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988 & Supp. 1992) provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to pre-
vent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions
on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited
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his business or property by reason of a violation"268 is authorized
to bring a civil suit against the alleged offender. When mail fraud
is the predicate act, the complainant's injury must, of course, oc-
cur "by reason of" the "scheme to defraud." 'By reason of" re-
quires that the substantial elements of the RICO offense proxi-
mately cause the injury.269 Proximate cause, however, merely re-
quires a judicially cognizable relation between the injury asserted
and the injurious conduct alleged.2 70 It ought not be read inflex-
ibly, however, to require justifiable reliance. Justifiable reliance
may, of course, establish proximate cause, but it is not invariably
required to prove it. Reliance is a sufficient, but not a necessary
cause.
Some of the circuit courts of appeal, however, have failed to
appreciate this distinction. Either by classifying mail fraud as com-
mon-law fraud or by reading reliance into the "by reason of" pro-
vision of the RICO statute, these courts require that reliance be
both alleged and proven. Although their reasoning for such a
determination is typically ambiguous, this reasoning implicitly
looks to the common-law elements of the crime of obtaining prop-
erty by false pretenses and the tort of deceit. This judicial tenden-
cy may be illustrated by a review of their relevant decisions.
to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the
enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign com-
merce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due
provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section ...
Pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such re-
straining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the accep-
tance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
267 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (Supp. 1992).
268 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
269 Holmes v. Securities Inv. Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1318 (1992).
270 Id. Justice Souter's majority opinion explained:
Here we use "proximate cause" to label generically the judicial tools used
to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of that person's own acts.
At bottom, the notion of proximate cause reflects "ideas of what justice de-
mands, or of what is administratively possible and convenient."
Id (citations omitted).
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1. The Second Circuit
In United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 271 for example, the
Second Circuit explained:
It is generally stated that there are two elements to the offense
of mail fraud: use of the mails and a scheme to defraud. Be-
cause only a "scheme to defraud" and not actual fraud is re-
quired for conviction, we have said that "it is not essential that
the Government allege or prove that purchasers were in fact
defrauded." . . . But this does not mean that the government
can escape the burden of showing that some actual harm or
injury was contemplated by the schemer. Proof that someone was
actually defrauded is unnecessary simply because the -critical
element in a "scheme to defraud" is "fraudulent intent,"...
and therefore the accused need not have succeeded in his
scheme to be guilty of the crime
27 2
While the court reasoned that actual victimization is good evi-
dence of the schemer's intent, it was not necessary to violate the
statute.2
3
In 1990, however, the Second Circuit considered the use of
mail fraud as a predicate act in a RICO violation in County of
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 274 and worked a quite different
result. Looking to the language of the RICO statute, the Second
Circuit reasoned that because RICO provides that only persons
injured "by reason of" a RICO violation may maintain a civil RICO
claim, mail fraud in the context of a civil RICO claim required
the victim's reliance.
2 7 5
2. The Fourth Circuit
A similar course of decisions may be traced in the Fourth
Circuit. In United States v. Mandel,271 the court explained that
271 421 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1970).
272 Id. at 1180 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
273 Id. at 1181.
274 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990) (complaint involved false construction date estima-
tions inducing rate increases); see also Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 1993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 97,266, at 95,209-10 (2d Cir. Dec. 17, 1992) (relying on County of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., the court determined that in order "to establish the required
causal connection, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant's misrep-
resentations were relied on").
275 907 F.2d at 1311.
276 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.), affid in relevant part en ban4 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
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mail fraud is not limited by common-law definitions, and it is
"available to prosecute a scheme involving deception that employs
the mails in its execution that is contrary to public policy and
conflicts with accepted standards of moral uprightness, fundamen-
tal honesty, fair play and right dealing."2 77 Yet, in a subsequent
decision, the Fourth Circuit, too, worked a quite different result in
the civil RICO context. The court noted that
while . . . it is not necessary to establish detrimental reliance by
the victim in order to make out a violation of the federal mail
fraud statute . . . , such reliance is necessary to establish injury
to business or property "by reason of" a predicate act of mail
fraud within the meaning of [a RICO claim].27
3. The Fifth Circuit
In contrast to the Second and Fourth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
in Armco Industrial Credit Corp. v. SLT Warehouse Co.,2 79 appropri-
ately implemented its nontechnical definition of "scheme to de-
fraud"80 in the context of a civil RICO claim. Armco Industrial
Credit Corp. involved a fraudulent scheme that grew out of the
downturn in the oil field industry in the early eighties. The litiga-
tion involved three companies: Pritchett and Company, an oil field
supply manufacturer; Armco Industrial Credit Corporation, a com-
mercial lender; and SLT Warehouse Company, a national "field
warehouse" company. Armco advanced money to Pritchett, and
SLT served as "third party watchdogs over the debtor's invento-
ry."281' The three party agreement included a Pritchett employee
named Richard Conklin.212 Conklin served as a supervisor over-
seeing the inventory certification program pursuant to the
Pritchett/Armco loan agreement.2 s In mid-1981, consistent with
the ailing economy, the oil industry took a downturn. Consequent-
277 Id. at 1361.
278 Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1188 n.10 (4th Cir. 1988) (class action
against S&L and state insurance agency officials for misrepresentations that led to frozen
deposits and the loss of interest).
279 782 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1986).
280 See, e.g., United States v. Netterville, 553 F.2d 903, 909 (5th Cir. 1977) (scheme to
obtain money by false pretenses from persons induced to purchase oil dealerships), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 861, 1009 (1978); United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1229 (5th Cir.
1973) (drawing false securities prospectuses), cert. denie, 419 U.S. 825 (1974).
281 Armco, 782 F.2d at 477.
282 Id. at 478.
283 Id.
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ly, Pritchett also began to have cash flow problems,8 4 and the
president and the treasurer of the company set up a scheme in-
volving the submission of phony invoices to Armco. Armco failed
to discover the fraud."' As Pritchett's economical situation wors-
ened, the company became more and more dependent on the
fraudulent invoices. Conklin learned of the scam in the latter half
of 1981.26 When Armco itself subsequently discovered the
scheme, it brought suit against the Pritchett president and treasur-
er, Conklin, and SLT for the recovery of the unpaid monies it
had advanced to Pritchett.28 7 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit from
a jury verdict, SLT challenged the judge's refusal to instruct the
jury that Armco could only recover if it justifiably relied to its detri-
ment on Pritchett's fraudulent statements. 28 SLT's argument at-
tempted to connect the requirement for mail fraud under RICO
with the elements of obtaining property by false pretenses or de-
ceit at common law.2 9 The Fifth Circuit, however, held "[b]y
confusing mail fraud with common law fraud, SLT's argument falls
wide of the mark." " The court reasoned that to prove a vio-
lation of mail fraud only three elements were required: "(1) the
defendant participated in some scheme or artifice to defraud, (2)
the defendant or someone associated with the scheme used the
mails or 'caused' the mails to be used, and (3) the use of the
mails was for the purpose of exacting the scheme.""' The court
then emphasized that "it is not necessary that the victim have det-
rimentally relied on the mailed misrepresentations." 292 After clar-
ifying this issue, the court, however, reversed and remanded based




287 Id. at 479.
288 Id. at 479-81. The other issues raised on appeal are not relevant here.
289 See supra Part I.D and Part I.
290 Armco, 782 F.2d at 481.
291 Id. at 481-82 (citing United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1985)).
292 Armco, 782 F.2d at 482 (citing United States v. Goldberg, 455 F.2d 479, 481 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972)).
293 Armco, 782 F.2d at 487. Compare United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 427
(5th Cir. 1980) ("intended victim need not have been actually defrauded in order for a
mall fraud violation to have occurred"), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981) witlh Laird v.
Integrated Resources, Inc., 897 F.2d 826, 839 n.53 (5th Cir. 1990) ("materiality and reli-
ance, however, are not elements of either wire or mail fraud") (citations omitted).
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4. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit's jurisprudence contains contradictory deci-
sions on independent mail fraud cases as well as civil RICO cases
with mail fraud as a predicate act. In Epstein v. United States,2
4
the Sixth Circuit read "scheme to defraud" to require a showing
of "actual fraud." In Epstein, case officers and directors of a brew-
ing company set up an extortionate scheme using the mails. The
circuit court distinguished between "actual" and "constructive"
fraud. Actual fraud consists of "deception intentionally practiced to
induce another to part with property or to surrender some legal
right, and which accomplishes the end designed."25 By contrast,
[c]onstructive fraud is a breach of legal or equitable duty
which, in spite of the fact that there is no moral guilt resulting
from the breach of duty, the law declares fraudulent because of
its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or private confi-
dence, or to injure public interests.'
A violation of mail fraud, the court held, requires a scheme involv-
ing actual fraud. 7 Somewhat ambiguously, however, the court
also stated that the "crime of using the mails to defraud is not
limited to what would give rise to a common law action for de-
ceit .... ,"28 Other Sixth Circuit decisions, however, unequivo-
cally adopt the nontechnical standard' for mail fraud. Never-
theless, when it comes to civil RICO, the decisions require reliance
to establish a valid claim.'
294 174 F.2d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 1949).
295 Id. at 765.
296 Id. at 766 (citations omitted).
297 Id.
298 Id. Judge McAllister further provided that
the fact that the crime of using the mails to defraud is not limited to what
would give rise to a common-law action for deceit means, for instance, that a
showing of loss to the victim is not necessary to conviction for mail fraud; it
does not imply that constructive fraud, or anything less than actual fraud, can
sustain the charge of using the mails to defraud.
Id.
299 See, &g., United States v. Van Dyke, 605 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1979).
300 See, eg., Grantham and Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., 831 F.2d
596 (6th Cir. 1987) (exclusive distributor in one area had right of first refusal in second
area, but it was given to another company, directed verdict affirmed as plaintiff failed to
establish at trial the "causation necessary for a 1964(c) RICO claim" because it had "in
no way relied on [the alleged fraudulent letters] to its detriment."); Bender v. Southland
Corp., 749 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1984) (affirming dismissal of civil RICO claim because
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5. The Seventh Circuit
Decisions in the Seventh Circuit adopted the nontechnical
standard of mail fraud at an early date.0 1 More recently, howev-
er, panels of the Circuit have expressed discomfort with the po-
tential breadth of the statute. In United States v. Dial,302 for exam-
ple, Judge Posner cautioned:
When the broad language of the statutes ("Whoever, having
devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud.. . "), which punishes the scheme to defraud rather
than the completed fraud itself, is read by the light of the
broad concept of fraud that has evolved in civil cases and the
precept that the mail and wire fraud statutes are not confined
to common law fraud .... concern naturally arises that the
criminal law will be used to hold businessmen to the maxi-
mum, rather than minimum, standards of ethical behavior.
303
The court's opinion, however, declined to consider the outer
boundaries of the statute. 4
Two years later, Judge Posner went beyond his cautionary
words in Dial and affirmatively moved toward restricting the stat-
ute. In United States v. Holzer,305 a judge was involved in a scheme
bribing lawyers that were scheduled to appear before him. Judge
Posner first recognized that "[t]he legal meaning of 'fraud' 'is not
limited to deceit or misrepresentation; it includes overreaching,
undue influence, and other forms of misconduct. " " Judge
Posner then repudiated the nontechnical standard of fraud,0 7
arguing that the "moral uprightness" approach "is much too
broad, and, given the ease of satisfying the mailing require-
ment, . . . would put federal judges in the business of creating
"308what in effect would be common law crimes ....
plaintiff failed to allege reasonable detrimental reliance).
301 See, e.g., United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96, 106 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 943 (1952).
302 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 838 (1985).
303 Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
304 Id.
305 816 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S. 807 (1987), on remand,
840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1988).
306 Id. at 309.
307 Id.
308 Id. (citations omitted).
Pursuant to Rule 40(f) of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Circuit requires
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In Reynolds v. East Dyer Development Co.,' another panel uti-
lized Judge Posner's opinion in Holzer as a basis to impose a re-
quirement of reliance on a civil RICO claimant. In Reynolds, devel-
opers encountered soft soil that was not suitable for building while
constructing the Reynolds's home. The developer explained the
problem to the Reynolds and further proposed a cure to the prob-
lem. To the dismay of both the Reynolds and the developer, sever-
al problems were still present after the construction was complete.
Thereafter, the Reynolds sued the developer for not disclosing a
soil report prior to selling the lot. The Reynolds' complaint in-
cluded a RICO count. The panel affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion that the home buyers had not shown a scheme to defraud by
the developers under the mail fraud statute. Judge Manion's opin-
ion, too, warned of the dangers of a broad interpretation of the
statuteY' 0 The panel then denied the plaintiffs claim by using
the element of reliance to limit mail fraud in a RICO context.
3 1'
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of [the Seventh Circuit] adopting a
position which would overrule a prior decision of [the Seventh Circuit] or create
a conflict between or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first cir-
culated among the active members of [the Seventh Circuit] and a majority of
them do not vote to rehear in banc the issue of whether the position should be
adopted.
Cir. R. 40(f) (7th Cir. 1991). Similarly, in the District of Columbia, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, all such petitions are fully circulated only if the panel rec-
ommends en banc consideration. See, e.g., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 726, 727-30 (1965); see
also United States v. Splawn, 963 F.2d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1992) ("A three-judge panel
may not overrule circuit precedent."). Moreover, in Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,
978 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1992), Judge Manion specifically recognized the Rule 40(f) re-
quirement. He explained that "[b]ecause of a possible conflict with [a previous decision],
this opinion has been circulated to the full court pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(f)." Id. at
351 n.2.
309 882 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1989).
310 Id. at 1252. Judge Manion explained:
Given the -pervasive use of the mails and of telephone and related services in
the business world, along with the ease of satisfying the mailing or wiring re-
quirement, see, eg., Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, re/jg den., 490 U.S.
1076 (1989), such a broad meaning of fraud for the mail and wire fraud stat-
utes "would put federal judges in the business of creating what in effect would
be common law crimes, i.e., crimes not defined by statute." Holzer, 816 F.2d at
309.
Reynolds, 882 F.2d at 1252.
. 311 Id. at 1253.
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6. The Eighth Circuit
The jurisprudence of the Eighth Circuit, like that of the Sixth
Circuit, contains contradictory decisions. The Eighth Circuit has
squarely held that mail fraud is not limited by the elements of
common-law fraud in both RICO and non-RICO claims.
31 2 Well
before the emergence of civil RICO claims, in United States v.
States, 13  the court, following Durland, appropriately acknowl-
edged that "the concept of fraud in [section] 1341 is to be con-
strued very broadly."3 14 Nevertheless, the court has also superim-
posed the common-law fraud elements of materiality and reliance
upon civil RICO claims based on allegations of mail or wire fraud
as predicate acts.1 ' In Flowers v. Continental Grain Co., 16 for ex-
ample, the court held that reliance is required in a mail fraud
claim. In Flowers, the former manager of a rendering plant
brought an action against the owners alleging that they had vio-
lated the RICO statute. The allegation further asserted that the
manager had consequently suffered injuries. 17 One of the al-
leged predicate acts in Flowers was a section 1341 violation. In
examining the sufficiency of the allegation, the Flowers court stated
that the complaint was insufficient because such an allegation
requires an assertion that "plaintiff has parted with property be-
cause of his reliance on representations made by defendants that
they knew were false." 18 Similarly, in Horn v. Ray E. Friedman &
Co.,319 the court held that reliance was an element of a RICO
claim based on the wire fraud statute.
7. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit also interprets "scheme to defraud" by a
nontechnical standard. 2 9  In United States v. Goldberg,21 for
312 Compare Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 991 (8th Cir.
1989) (considering subcontractors alleging fraud, court concluded that mail fraud is not
dependent on common-law fraud) with United States v. McNeive, 536 F.2d 1245, 1249
n.10 (8th Cir. 1976) (a misrepresentation of fact is not required in order to establish
mail fraud).
313 488 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 1973).
314 1& at 764.
315 See, e.g., Horn v. Ray E. Friedman & Co., 776 F.2d 777, 780-82 (8th Cir. 1985);
Flowers v. Continental Grain Co., 775 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1985).
316 775 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1985).
317 Id.
318 Id. at 1054.
319 776 F.2d 777, 780-82 (8th Cir. 1985).
320 See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 689 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1982) (money
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example, the court reasoned that mail fraud and common-law
fraud were two separate concepts. The defendant devised a
scheme to purchase airline tickets on his credit card without any
intention of actually paying for them; he then sold the tickets at a
reduced price to another defendant in the case. Subsequently, this
defendant sold the tickets to the public at a reduced rate. The
court stated that "[i]t is not necessary to show that reliance of the
victim was induced by misrepresentation of the defendant, nor is
it necessary to show that the victim was misled." 2 Nevertheless,
when mail fraud was used as a predicate in civil RICO claims, the
court has actually sanctioned attorneys for not showing reli-
ance.
3 23
8. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence also confuses mail fraud
with common-law deceit 3 24  In OMalky v. O'Neil4 2' the
plaintiffs claimed that they were fired for their refusal to partici-
laundering scheme in part to avoid state law requiring disclosure of contributions to state
legislators); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.) (insurance fraud),
. denied, 447 U.S. 928 (1980); United States v. Louderman, 576 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th
Cir.) (wire fraud), cert. dened 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
321 455 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 967 (1972).
322 I at 481; see also United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1988)
(scheme to defraud investors through operation of a corporation by devising fraudulent
purchase orders for a poster marketed and sold by the defendants), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1016 (1989); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1981) (scheme to
defraud by marketing bicentennial items).
323 MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1986) (insurer charged
lawyers defending cases brought against directors with collusion to instigate those claims.
MGIC's claim required duty to disclose, reliance, and harm flowing from the reliance.
There was a duty but no reliance. Since MGIC made serious charges of mail fraud and
racketeering without alleging reliance, it showed "scurrilous speculation" and the court
imposed attorneys' fees as a sanction). See also Atari Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 970 F.2d
641, 645-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (absence of justifiable reliance, which "insures ... causal
connection between misrepresentation ad... harm," defeats federal securities, and
RICO claim).
324 Pursuant to the reorganization of the circuit courts, the newly created Eleventh
Circuit adopted the jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981). Thus, "the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit . . . as that court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down by
that court prior to the close of business on that date, shall be binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit . . . ." Id. at 1207.
325 887 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990); see also Ross v.
Bank South, NA, 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (where investors did not
read prospectus, reliance requirement for securities claims was not met, reliance on the
market not available; civil RICO claim was not met for failure to demonstrate reliance).
But see infra note 343 (target theory).
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pate in or continue to conceal a mail fraud scheme. The district
court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a RICO
claim because their only injury, loss of employment, was not
caused by the predicate acts of mail fraud.3 2 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal. The plaintiff's only allegation was that
their injury arose as a consequence of their refusal to participate
in or to conceal their superior's fraudulent scheme. Accordingly,
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries was their superior's
decision to fire them for refusing to participate in or to conceal
the scheme, but not the mail fraud scheme. 27 The court stated,
"plaintiffs lack standing because they are not the victims or targets
of mail fraud."3 28
Applying the O'Malky line of reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit
held in Pelletier v. Zweife4329 that mail fraud was synonymous with
common-law fraud. The Pelletier court determined that "as the
words 'deceit' and 'scheme' imply, the government must show, not
only that the defendant's actions would have deceived a reasonably
prudent person, but also that the defendant had the requisite
mens rea."330 The court next made the illogical analytical jump
that because the defendant must have "had a 'conscious knowing
intent to defraud[,] "331 this mens rea element requires that the
perpetrator had anticipated reliance. 32 Interestingly, the Pelletier
court relied on Fifth Circuit precedents to arrive at its conclusion;
yet the Fifth Circuit squarely holds that mail fraud is not restricted
by the elements of common-law fraud or deceit.3 33 Using the
Fifth Circuit decision as a stepping stone in its analysis, the court
concluded that,
[a] defendant cannot possibly intend to deceive someone if he
does not believe that his intended "victim" will act on his de-
ception. Mail and wire fraud, just like common law fraud, thus
326 O'Malley, 887 F.2d at 1557-58.
327 Id. at 1561.
328 Id. at 1563.
329 921 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991).
330 Id. at 1499. But see supra note 112 referring to old prudence cases.
331 Pelktier, 921 F.2d at 1499 (citing United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (5th
Cir. 1980) and quoting United States v. Kyle, 257 F.2d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. de-
nied, 358 U.S. 927 (1959)).
332 Pelklier, 921 F.2d at 1499.
333 See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 633 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied,
451 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Bruce, 488 F.2d 1224, 1229 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit is bound by the Fifth
Circuit's jurisprudence. See supra note 324.
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entail "[a]n intention to induce the [victim] to act or to re-
frain from action in reliance upon the misrepresentation."'
4
9. RICO's "by reason of" Provision
This review of the mail fraud and civil RICO jurisprudence
amply demonstrates the tendency of circuit courts of appeal to
restrict "scheme to defraud" with the common-law crime of ob-
taining property by false pretenses or the common-law tort of
deceit elements when using mail fraud as a predicate act in RICO
claims. Yet, as discussed previously, all that ought to be required is
a showing of a scheme to defraud, intent to defraud, the use of
the mails, the other RICO elements, and proximate cause, howev-
er shown. While the victim's reliance may be a sufficient showing of
proximate cause, it ought not be a necessary showing.3 3 5 Because
the same "by reason of" language appears in other federal stat-
utes,3 6 these statutes may provide guidance as to the correct RI-
CO interpretation of the "by reason of" language.
In Mead v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 830,"'8 the
Ninth Circuit provided an appropriate definition for the "by rea-
son of" language in section 303 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 ("LMRA"). 3" This definition is particularly rel-
evant because the LMRA was also "drawn ... from the treble
damage provision of the Clayton Act" and, just like RICO, "was
enacted as an alternative to" using the antitrust laws directly." 9
The Ninth Circuit correctly reasoned that injury "occur[s] 'by rea-
son of' particular unlawful conduct if such conduct 'materially
334 PelIetr, 921 F.2d at 1499 (citing to KEErON Elr. AL., supra note 115, at 728, recit-
ing the elements of common-law deceit.)
335 See, e.g., Taffet v. Southern Co., 930 F.2d 847, 856-57 (11th Cir. 1991) (fraud on
utility gives rise to RICO claim by rate payers), rev'd on other grounds, 958 F.2d 1514
(11th Cir. 1992); Environmental Tectonics v. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1067 (3d
Cir. 1988) (fraud on government gives rise to RICO claim by losing bidder), a f'd on oth-
er grounds, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
336 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(1)
(1988); 22 U.S.C. § 2399b(a) (1988); 29 t.S.C. § 186(c) (1988); 41 U.S.C. § 119 (1988);
46 U.S.C. § 1227 (1988).
337 See Holmes v. Securities Inv. Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1316-19 (1992)
(RICO language borrowed from antitrust where proximate cause jurisprudence followed).
338 523 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1975).
339 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 303, 61 Stat. 158 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1988)).
340 Mead, 523 F.2d at 1376.
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contributed' to the injury... or was a 'substantial factor' in
bringing it about . . .. ,
The suggestion that false pretense or deceit-like elements
should be read into "scheme to defraud" is inconsistent not only
with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, but also traditional fraud
jurisprudence outside of the deceit area. Even the common law
did not require a showing of reliance as the exclusive means of
showing proximate cause.2 The nature of today's market, more-
over, demonstrates the inappropriateness of such common-law
restrictions that presupposed face-to-face transaction and a philoso-
phy of caveat emptor. As it is understood in modem jurispru-
dence, the traditional "target theory" of fraud itself demonstrates
that the victim in a fraudulent scheme need not necessarily be the
primay target in order to sue.a4
341 d. Accord Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir.
1990). It is well established, too, that proximate cause is usually an issue for the jury.
KEETON Er. AL, supra note 115, § 41.
342 See, eg., Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 188 S.E. 390 (N.C. 1936) (tes-
tator deceived into disinheriting plaintiff); Mitchell v. Langley, 85 S.E. 1050 (Ga. 1915)
(holder of life insurance policy fraudulently induced to change beneficiaries).
343 In the English case of Peek v. Gurney, 6 L.R.-E. & I. App. (H.L. 1873), the
House of Lords decided that an investor who bought stock from a stockholder could not
recover from the director of a corporation who issued a prospectus for the purpose of
inducing the public to purchase stock from the company. Responsibility, the Lords said,
was limited to those who the director had desired to influence in the manner in which
the damage was foreseen. While Peek was adopted in section 531 of the Restatement of
Torts, its validity in its narrowest form is hardly current law. As W. Page Keeton ob-
served, "[t]he limitation thus imposed must, however, be qualified to a considerable ex-
tent. . . . [T]here is a very definite tendency to depart from the old position .
KEETON ET AL, supra note 115, § 107, at 743-44.
In In re EDC, Inc., 930 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1991), which involved a civil RICO
claim, the Seventh Circuit, for example, discussed the "target theory" at length. In LDG,
the plaintiffs alleged that the company's corporate restructuring was designed to defraud
the pension fund beneficiaries. The court responded that the primary victim of the al-
leged scheme was not one of the plaintiffs, but rather, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation since the plaintiffs were creditors. The court reasoned, however, that the
plaintiff-creditors had standing to sue. The court distinguished the EDC scenario from
one of transferred intent, and examined the general rule in fraud cases whereby you are
liable only to intended victims. Id. at 1279 (citing KEETON ET AL, supra note 115, § 107,
at 743-45). Yet, the court stated, "[o]ne can be an intended victim without being the
primary victim." EDC, 930 F.2d at 1279. The court explained:
Suppose you blow up a plane carrying X and Y in order to kill X. If both die
in the 'explosion, you are just as much Y's murderer as X's, not because of the
fiction of transferred intent but because you knew that Y (or any other person
who might be a passenger on the plane) would die if your plot against X suc-
ceeded.
Id. (citing United States v. McAnally, 666 F.2d 1116, 1119 (7th Cir. 1981)). "It is not a
transferred-intent case because nothing went wrong with your plan; it is a case of ex-
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Indeed, the complexity of today's market justifies the adoption
of the "fraud on the market" theory as a means of applying the
securities laws5 " to complex schemes to defraud without circum-
treme recklessness, equated to deliberateness." ED, 930 F.2d at 1279 (citing Duckworth
v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53 (7th Cir. 1985)). In the present situation, if the
plaintiffs' allegations were true, then the company had to fool the plaintiffs in order to
keep the scheme going. Nevertheless, for other reasons the court did not find fraud. But
see Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying a "target
rationale," federal mail fraud only occurs if the party deceived by the fraudulent scheme
is also injured by it). If Judge Posner's analysis in EDC is correct-and it is persua:
sive-Corcoran was wrongly decided.
344 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992), pr6vides further
insight into the propriety of a reliance requirement in the mail fraud context in the
modern market. Similar to the mail fraud statute, the securities laws developed against
the grain of caveat emptor. When calling for securities reform in 1933, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt asked that Congress add "[L]et the seller also beware" to the caveat emptor
maxim. Securities Markets Oversight and Drexel Burnham Lambert: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight Investigations of the House Comm on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1988) (statement of Rep. John Dingell (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt)). Rule lOb-5
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mais, or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artiice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, oi
(3) To engage in any act, practice, *or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added). The plaintiff's prima facie case in a 10b-5 claim
requires standing (the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of a security) and jurisdic-
tion. Jurisdiction requires: (1) use of interstate commerce; (2) use of the mails; or (3)
use of a national security exchange, and (4) a substantial violation of the rule. A viola-
tion may be the commission of a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or a misrepre-
sentation or half truth. A misrepresentation includes an omission if there is a duty to
disclose.
Focusing on the issues of reliance and causation, Justice Blackmun applied the secu-
rities statute in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In
Affiliated, Indian tribal funds were invested in a corporation and stock was distributed to
members of the tribe. Two bank employees, however, maintained an interest in the stock
that enabled these employees to help themselves as well as other whites, to buy from the
Indians at the low Indian-market price and resell to whites at a much higher white-mar-
ket price. The Indians sued the bank and its two employees alleging a lOb-5 violation.
In finding for the Indians, Justice Blackmun wrote:
the Court of Appeals erred when it held that there was no violation of the Rule
unless the record disclosed evidence of reliance on material fact misrepresenta-
tions by (the two employees]. We do not read Rule 10b-5 so restrictively. To be
sure, the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue
statement of a material fact and the omission to state a material fact. The first
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scribing them by a narrow reading of common-law reliance."45 If
the securities statutes can be interpreted in a flexible fashion, so
and third subparagraphs are not so restricted. These defendants' activities,...
disclose, within the very language of one or the other of those subparagraphs, a
"course of business" or a "device, scheme or artifice" that operated as a fraud
upon the Indian sellers. This is so because the defendants devised a plan and
induced the mixed-blood holders of UDC stock to dispose of their shares with-
out disclosing to them material facts that reasonably could have been expected
to influence their decisions to sell. The individual defendants, in a distinct sense,
were market makers, not only for their personal purchases . . . but for the
other sales their activities produced. This being so, they possessed the affirmative
duty under the Rule to disclose this fact to the mixed-blood sellers. 'It is no
answer to urge that, as to some of the petitioners, these defendants may have
made no positive representation or recommendation. The defendants may not
stand mute while they facilitate the mixed-bloods' sales to those seeking to profit
in the non-Indian market the defendants had developed and encouraged and
with which they were fully familiar. The sellers had the right to know that the
defendants were in a position to gain financially from their sales and that their
shares were selling for a higher price in that market ....
Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a failure to dis-
close, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable investor might
have considered them important in the making of this decision.
406 U.S. at 152-54 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). justice Blackmun's opinion elim-
inated reliance from cases of nondisclosure. But see Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d
234, 238 (2d Cir. 1975) ("By this language the [Supreme] Court, rather than abolishing
reliance as a prerequisite to recovery, was recognizing the frequent difficulty in proving, as
a practical matter, that the alleged misrepresentation, allegedly relied upon, caused the
injury."). See also Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, 1993 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,266 (2d
Cir. Dec. 17, 1992). "In order to prevail on a claim under § 12(2) . . . [r]eliance by the
buyer need not be shown, for § 12(2) 'is a broad anti-fraud measure and imposes liabil-
ity whether or not the purchaser actually relied on the misstatement.'" Id. at 95,204-05
(citation omitted).
345 Subsequent cases involving 1Ob-5 claims involving face-to-face transactions, however,
have insisted on imposing the element of reliance. See Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp.,
363 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 713
(8th Cir. 1978). But see Lake v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 96,509 (N.D. Ind. May 22, 1978) (presumption of reliance under the
Affiliated case would not be indulged where the action is predicated on personal, face-to-
face dealings). In Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 270 (3d Cir.
1972) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972), a case
decided prior to Affiliated, Judge Adams stated that the proper distinction between the
cases was between individual actions and class actions. "[Tihe cases seem to fall into two
categories: individual damage suits requiring proof of reliance, and class or injunctive
actions not requiring proof of reliance beyond the objective standard." Id. at 290. judge
Adams continued: "the objective test was primarily adopted to obviate the need to prove
reliance on the part of each member of the class." Id. Consistent with Judge Adams'
proposition, most of the early case law examining reliance and holding that reliance is
required were cases of non-disclosure involving privately-held corporations and one-on-one
dealings. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
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should mail fraud and RICO. The flexible approach of the "fraud
on the market" theory in the securities area, therefore, demon-
strates the impropriety of imposing an unnecessary or inflexible
reliance element on the mail fraud statute as it is implemented
through civil RICO, 6  particularly when the mail fraud statute
346 The "fraud on the market" theory, introduced by the Ninth Circuit in Blackie v.
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976), demonstrates the
illegitimacy of imposing an inflexible reliance restriction on a provision designed to com-
bat fraud in large scale scams. Explaining the theory, the court in Mlackie stated:
A purchaser on the stock exchanges . . . relies generally on the supposition that
the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artifi-
dally inflated the price, and thus indirectly on, the truth of the representations
underlying the stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price he pays
reflects material misrepresentations. Requiring direct proof from each purchaser
that he relied on a particular representation when purchasing would defeat re-
covery by those whose reliance was indirect, despite the fact that the causational
chain is broken only if the purchaser would have purchased the stock even had
he known of the misrepresentation.
Id. at 907. The courts considering the issue, however, uniformly adopted the theory.
Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 743 (l1th Cir. 1984) (citing to T.J. Raney &
Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983),
cat denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984)); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated
as moat sub noa. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983). While no circuit
has specifically rejected the theory, Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th
Cir. 1978) looked in a different direction by holding that there is no presumption of
reliance where new issues are involved and claims are based on affirmative misrepresenta-
tion.
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Supreme Court adopted the
fraud on the market theory. In Lezinson, sellers of stock, during the period prior to for-
mal announcement of a merger, brought a Rule lob-5 action alleging that material mis-
representations had been made due to the denial of merger negotiations prior to official
announcement. The Court held that the presumption of reliance upon misstatements
made by a corporation, supported by the fraud on the market theory, may be applied in
Rule lOb-5 cases, so that each individual in a class action would not have to show direct
reliance on misstatements. The fraud on the market theory requires that the plaintiff
demonstrate:
(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the misrepre-
sentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on an efficient market;
(4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to
misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares
between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was
revealed.
Id. at 248 n.27 (citation omitted). The presumption of reliance, however, may be rebut-
ted through an attempt to demonstrate that the price was not affected by the misrep-
resentation or that purchasers or sellers did not trade in reliance on the integrity of the
market price.
By adopting the fraud on the market theory, the Supreme Court has eliminated the
reliance element from cases involving large scale market transactions. Applying the fraud
on the market theory in the present context illustrates the illegitimacy of reading an
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can be violated in situations where no misrepresentation, commis-
sion or omission, need be shown.
V. FRAUD AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
The ill-advised character of imposing a reliance requirement
on a mail fraud offense in a civil RICO action is amply demon-
strated by considering the present state of the economy and the
explosion of white-collar crime in recent years. White-collar crime
undermines faith in our business, financial, and governmental
institutions, and it typically results in tremendous losses to the
nation's economy that are ultimately borne by consumers and
taxpayers. 7 The S&L scandal alone will cost American taxpayers
at least $500 billion over the next thirty years. 48
Typically, the argument is made that civil RICO ought not be
applied to "garden variety" frauds. That argument is then followed
with a proposal to circumscribe the statute in all situations. Apart
from the objection that the proposed remedy is broader than the
supposed wrong, this argument is premised on the erroneous
conclusion that fraud is a "garden variety" problem. 
49
inflexible reliance requirement into the mail fraud statute. Mail fraud was designed to
combat the ills of the industrial revolution and large scale market activity. See supra Part
III. Certainly, a fraud on the market rationale ought to apply in this context, too. "The
question the reliance analysis ultimately seeks to resolve is simply whether the alleged
misrepresentations were a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury." Atari Corp. v. Ernst &
Whinney, 970 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1992). Certainly, if the other three elements of
mail fraud are met along with the usual elements of RICO and traditional proximate
cause standards outside of the common-law fraud area, no need exists for further analysis
under a narrowly focused "justifiable reliance" doctrine.
347 1991 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 9. "For these reasons, the Department renewed its vig-
orous effort to detect and uproot fraud and other white collar crimes. The creation of
several new units in the Criminal Division dedicated to prosecuting money laundering,
insurance fraud, and computer crime illustrates this commitment to aggressive enforce-
ment." Id.
348 Michael Quint, New Estimate on Savings Bailout Says Cost Could Be $500 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1990, at Al (reporting General Accounting Office estimate).
Since October 1, 1988, the Department [of Justice] has charged 871 defendants
in major savings and loan fraud cases. Of those charged, 661 have been convict-
ed including over 200 presidents, chief executive officers, board chairmen, direc-
tors and officers, along with 427 other defendants who defrauded thrift institu-
tions. Courts ordered over $12 million in fines and over $372 million in restitu-
tion.
1991 ATr' GEN. ANN. REP. at 9.
349 See Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 473
U.S. 922 (1985). There the court stated:
Despite the clarity of congress' language [in drafting RICO], defendants ar-
gue that, since RICO's primary purpose is to eradicate organized crime, it is
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It is anything but. In 1970, Congress specifically focused RICO
[not] directed ... against businessmen engaged in "garden variety fraud" .
While RICO's primary focus may have been on organized crime, when consider-
ing the statute congress also recognized that fraud is a pervasive problem
throughout our society . .. which causes billions of dollars in loss each year.
Congress further acknowledged that existing state and federal law was not capa-
ble of dealing with this problem.
1& at 528 (citations omitted). Further, Commissioner Philip A. Feigin aptly observed:
Euphemisms like "commercial disputes," "commercial frauds," "garden variety
frauds" and "technical violations" . . . are sanitized phrases often used by "legiti-
mate businesses and individuals" to distinguish their frauds from the "real"
frauds perpetrated by the "real" crooks. Yet all willful fraudulent conduct has in
common the elements of premeditation, planning, motivation, execution over
time and injury to victims and commerce. And it is. all crime.
Oversight Hearings on Civil Rico Suits Brought Under 18 U.S.C. 1964(c): Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on theJudidiay, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 535 (1985) (statement of Philip A. Feigin,
Assistant Securities Commissioner, Colorado Division of Securities, and Chair, Special
Projects Committee, Eiiforcement Section, North American Securities Administrators Asso-
ciation, Inc.). District courts also frankly acknowledged that their restrictive reading of
RICO is motivated by a fear of a "flood of litigation." See, eg., McCarthy v. Pacific Loan,
Inc., 600 F. Supp. 137, 139 (D. Haw. 1984). Such fears are misplaced factually. Myths,
supra note 114, at 869-73 (review of civil filing data). This "fear" is also a constitutionally
impermissible factor to employ in construing a statute. The fact that litigation might be a
burden on courts is "not sufficient to justify a judicial decision to alter [a] congressional-
ly [drafted remedial scheme]." Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 512 n.13 (1982).
It is a legislative function to resolve "the pros and cons of whether a statute should
sweep broadly or narrowly." United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484 (1984). Congress
resolved those "pros and cons" when it stated unambiguously that RICO is to be con-
strued broadly. 84 Stat. 941 (1970). "[R]ewriting [RICO] is [, therefore,] a job for Con-
gress, if it is so inclined .... " H.J. Inc. v. Northvestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
249 (1989).
Several rules of civil procedure also promise, if properly used, to have a substantial
and salutary impact on frivolous or meritless RICO litigation. See FED. R. Cr. ,P. 11,
19(b), 26, 56. These tools are sufficient to reduce frivolous or meritless litigation. Judicial
Conference of the United States, Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 56 (1983); see also Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991) (inherent
power to impose litigation costs on party as sanction). These rules, moreover, are not
only being vigorously enforced now, but the district courts are using a "RICO Case State-
ment" that requires plaintiffs to provide the court with a statement of what they expect
to prove; it is then used to dismiss improper litigation. Compare Old Time Enter., Inc. v.
International Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1217 (5th Cir. 1989) (order proper) with
Marriott Bros. v. Gage, 911 F.2d 1105, 1108, 1109-11 (5th Cir. 1990) (plaintiffs bound by
answer to order). Rule 56, too, is now extensively used to curtail implausible claims.
Compare Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986) with California Architectural Bldg. Prods. Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818
F.2d 1466, 1468-69 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988). "Upon review . . .
RICO abuse is not a serious problem for our legal system so long as counsel and courts
appreciate the utility of existing remedial procedures. Accordingly, both Congress and the
courts should recognize that abuse arguments are more likely motivated by hostility to
the RICO remedy." Michael Goldsmith & Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuse. The Allega-
tions in Contex 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 103-04 (1986).
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on "fraud."35 ° Congress then found that the traditional "sanc-
tions and remedies" for sanctioning fraud were "unnecessarily
limited in scope and impact. "S51 Congress, therefore, expressly
targeted RICO on fraud. 52
Although over two decades have passed since RICO became
law, the task of controlling fraud remains formidable. In 1974, the
United States Chamber of Commerce estimated the direct eco-
nomic cost of fraud as' $41.78 billion annually."' 3 Taking into
consideration the inflation rate since the 1974 study, fraud likely
costs society a figure more than four times that amount today.
54
This $200 billion loss is comparable to the impact of illicit drug
trafficking.
5
Moreover, these figures estimate merely the most obvious
losses to consumers. White-collar crime has a "serious influence on
the social fabric, and on the freedom of commercial and inter-
350 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922
(1970) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. III 1991 & Supp. 1992)).
351 Id. at 923. Congress was well aware that existing law, state and federal, was inade-
quate to address the problem. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981).
352 See 84 Stat. 922.
353 See CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
EVERYONE'S PROBLEM, EVERYONE'S Loss 6 (1974). The Chamber estimated the direct eco-
nomic cost of fraud as follows:
Billions of Dollars
(1) Bankruptcy Fraud 0.08
(2) Bribery, Kickbacks, & Payoffs 3.00
(3) Consumer Fraud 21.00
(4) Embezzlement 7.00
(5) Insurance Fraud 2.00
(6) Receiving Stolen Property 3.50
(7) Securities Theft and Fraud 4.00
(8) Credit Card and Check Fraud 1.10
(9) Computer-Related Crime 0.10
Id. Clearly, these figures are mere approximations. In all likelihood they are underestima-
tions. The fraud perpetrator obviously does not fill out "annual fraud reports." "'There is
little systematic data available regarding the incidence of white-collar crime." PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND
ITS IMPAC-AN ASSESSMENT 103 (1967). The two estimates of its cost that were made at
the time RICO was processed were loss of taxes on $25 to $40 billion of unreported
income annually and $500 million to $1 billion annually in securities fraud. Id.
354 1984 Arr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 42 ($200 billion).
355 See Drug Enforcement: Hearing on H.R. 526 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986) (remarks of Rep.
William J. Hughes, Chair of the Subcommittee; stating that $110 billion is spent annually
and that lost productivity and other costs are estimated to equal $60 billion); see also
Stephen Labathon, The Cost of Drug Abuse, $60 Billion a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1989, at
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personal transactions."35 6 Because white-collar offenders often oc-
cupy positions of trust, their violations have an impact beyond
their immediate target. Former FBI Director William H. Webster,
for example, appropriately remarked in 1982: 'Through use of
their position of trust, cunning and guile, white-collar criminals
undermine professional ... integrity ... and ultimately are re-
sponsible for the loss of billions of dollars annually .... 117 We
are all the victims of fraud.
Fraud directly interferes with the inner workings of the finan-
cial infrastructure and is insidiously linked to aspects of our cur-
rent national economic crisis."' For example, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency examined over 200 failed and
356 HERBERT EDELHERTz, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE-CLLAR
CRIME 9 (1970).
357 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judicary, and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions for 1983: Hearings Before a House Subcomm. on Appropriations; Part 7: Dep't of Justice,
97th Cong., 2d Sass. 1078 (1982).
358 See Renae V. Stevens, Note, Insider Abuse and Criminal Misconduct in Financial Insti-
tutions: A Ciiis?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 222 (1989) (links criminal abuse in the S&Ls
to our present economic plight); see also JAMES RING ADAMS, THE BIG FIX: INSIDE THE
S&L SCANDAL. How AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE OF POLITICS AND MONEY DESTROYED AMERICA'S
BANKING SYSTEM (1990) (taking a broad view of the banking and thrift crisis and examin-
ing in detail the collapse of the Butcher banks in Tennessee and the Ohio thrift crisis as
well as some of the Texas and California high fliers, who helped bankrupt the S&L in-
surance fund and who kept regulators from shutting down the reckless bankers); STEPHAN
PIZZO ET AL, INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF- AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989) (pre-
senting an intricately woven account of fraud at dozens of S&Ls and banks, paying partic-
ular attention to a group of deposit biokers, real estate developers, and thrift owners
who had documented connections to major organized crime figures and kept appearing
on the books of failed thrifts).
The criminal misconduct that contributed to the failure of Penn Square Bank in
Oklahoma, until recently one of the largest bank failures in American history, resulted in
charges of misapplication of bank funds, false entries in bank records, conspiracy, and
wire fraud. For criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Patterson, 827 F.2d 184 (7th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Patterson, 782 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lytle,
677 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Il1. 1988); United States v. Lytle, 658 F. Supp. 1321 (N.D. Ill.
1987). For civil litigation on fidelity bonds, see FDIC v. Hartford Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 590
(7th Cir. 1989). For a description of the circumstances leading to the Penn Square Bank
failure, see MARK SINGER, FUNNY MONEY (1985); PHILLIP L. ZWEIG, BELLY UP: THE COL-
LAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK (1985).
The role, good and bad, that accountants played in the collapse is instructive in
any consideration of the efforts of the accounting profession to limit its liability under
RICO in the thrift crisis. Efforts to "reform" RICO after the Supreme Court's decision in
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985), focused on Congress. See Oversight on
Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judicia, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
The accounting profession plays a leading role. Id. at 243-325 (statement of Ray J.
Groves, Chairman, American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants). No wonder, in light
of the role it was also playing in the as yet unseen S&L crisis. See infra note 365.
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healthy S&Ls and reported that fraud and insider abuse signifi-
cantly contributed to forty-six percent of the failures. 59 The
General Accounting Office ("GAO") studied 184 Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") insured banks that closed in 1987
and found that sixty-four percent of the failed banks revealed
insider abuse, and thirty-eight percent revealed insider fraud.-
The GAO has determined that fraud and insider abuse was the
most significant factor leading to the S&L crisis. 1 In addition, a
congressional study of 105 failed and now falling banks deduced
that fifty percent of all bank failures "are caused, in large part, by
the criminal misconduct of officers, directors and insiders."
6 2
The FDIC further conceded that forty-five percent of the bank
failures between 1980 and 1983 revealed criminal misconduct as
the "major contributing factor"6 3 of their demise. Fraud was,
therefore, a key factor in these S&L and bank failures. In fact,
former-President George Bush told the nation in 1989 that "un-
conscionable risk-taking, fraud and outright criminality [were]
factors"36 that led to the crisis. 65
359 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE: AN EVALUATION
OF THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF THE NATIONAL BANKS 9 (1988).
360 Examination and Supervision of Depositor Institutions: Hearings Before the House Comm
on Bankin& Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989) (unpublished state-
ment of Frederick D. Wolf, Director, General Accounting Office, Accounting and Finan-
cial Management Division).
361 I& at 29.
362 HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, FEDERAL RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL MISCON-
DUCT AND INSIDER ABUSE IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 1137,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1984) (report based on Subcommittee on Commerce, Con-
sumer, and Monetary Affairs June 28, 1983, and May 2-3, 1984, hearings and study, ex-
amining Federal Agency investigation and prosecution of banking criminal violations by fi-
nancial institution officers or employees).
363 Id. at 29.
364 President's News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989,
at D8.
365 White-collar professionals, in positions of trust, played key roles in many of these
failures. See James S. Granelli, Keating's Advisers Under Fire: Attorneys, Accountants Helped
Massive Fraud Work, Investors' Lawyers Say, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at D1; Byron Harris,
The S&L Looters Who May Get Away, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1990, at A14; Charles McCoy et
al., Hall of Shame: Besides S&L Owners, Host of Professionals Paved Way for Crisis, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 2, 1990, at Al; Albert B. Crenshaw, Criminal Conduct Said to Play Role in 40% of
SOL Failures, WASH. POST, July 19, 1990, at El (accountants, lawyers, brokers and other
professionals may be responsible for malpractice in 20% of the failures); Leslie Wayne,
Where Were The Accountants?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1989, at Cl; see also Lincoln Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) ("What is difficult to under-
stand is that with all the professional talent involved (both accounting and legal), why at
least one professional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that
took place in this case.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
In each deVelopment of the law [of theft], the particular
step taken was a resultant of forces determined largely by social
and economic conditions, the existing legal -sanctions, the
whole body of precedent, and the established judicial tech-
niques. The interplay of law, case, and conditions can be un-
derstood only when the meaning of each factor is known.'
In a misguided attempt to narrow the proper scope of the federal
mail fraud statute, as it is being implemented through civil RICO,
courts are ignoring the plain meaning of the statute. The courts
are incorrectly looking to the jurisprudential assumptions underly-
ing the common-law crime of obtaining money by false pretenses
and the common-law tort of deceit as means to restrict mail fraud
in the civil RICO context. Historical analysis, however, amply dem-
onstrates that mail fraud finds its precursor in the common law of
cheat. Section 1341 remains section 1341, even when it is used as
a RICO predicate. The courts, moreover, improperly use the "by
reason of" provision of RICO to require not only causation but
also that reliance be both alleged and .proven. This interpretation
of the proximate cause element is inconsistent with the "by reason
of" provisions in analogous statutes that do not require reliance.
If RICO is used with other law enforcement tools as Congress
intended, it can emerge as an effective means for combatting
fraud in such vital cases as the thrift and banking industries,
36 7
the pension field,-" and the insurance industries. 69 For "[if
366 HALT, supra note 18, at 36 (footnote omitted).
367 Both the RTC and FDIC use RICO. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Shearson-American Express,
Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1331 (D.P.R. 1987); FDIC v. Hardin, 608 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Tenn.
1985). See generally Prosecuting Fraud in the Thrift Industry: Hearings before the House Subcomm.
on Grim. Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
* 368 See, eg., Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th Cir. 1982) (pension plan
fraud; "Evidence . . . traces a pattern which seems distressingly prevalent today: the sav-
ings of working men and women are pilfered, embezzled, parlayed, mismanaged and
outright stolen by unscrupulous persons occupying positions of trust and confidence.").
RICO is being used successfully on behalf of plan beneficiaries. See, eg., Crawford v. La
Boucheria Bernard Ltd., No. 83.0780 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 1983), afftd, 815 F.2d 117 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied 484 U.S. 943 (1987); see also Jeff Gerth, House Panel Hears Troubles of
Pension-Insurance Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1993, at C1.
369 State insurance commissioners are using RICO to vindicate the interests of the
companies that have been defrauded. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356-58
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); North Carolina ex rel Long v. Alexander &
Alexander Servs., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 746, 749-51 (E.D.N.C. 1988). See generally Efforts to
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substantial progress can be made in the prevention, deterrence,
and successful prosecution of ... [white-collar] crimes, we may
reasonably anticipate substantial benefits to the material and quali-
tative aspects of our national life."3' 7 As the Supreme Court ob-
served in 1948, "[the mail fraud statute has] been regularly en-
forced by the executive officers and the courts for more than half
a century. [It is] now part and parcel of our governmental fab-
ric." 71 The courts are now unwisely unweaving that fabric.
3 7 2
Courtney Chetty Genco
Combat Fraud and Abuse in the Insurance Industy: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs: Part II, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) (hearing associated with S. REP. No. 262, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.).
370 EDELHERTZ, supra note 356, at 11.
371 Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948).
372 More than 100 years ago, the Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is easy, by very
ingenious and astute construction to evade the force of almost any statue, where a court
is so disposed .... Such a construction annuls [the statute] and renders it superfluous
and useless." Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 476 (1851) (Grier, J.). Dean
Roscoe Pound concluded that such "ingenious and astute" constructions "(1) . . .
tend[ed] to bring law into disrespect;" (2) "subject[ed] the courts to political pressure;
[and]" (3) "invite[d] an arbitrary personal element in judicial administration." 3 ROSCOE
POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 488 (1959). It threatened, he found, to make "laws ...worth lit-
tie" and to "break down" the "legal order" itself. Id. at 490. See generally Note, Civil RICO:
The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982).
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,Appendix
SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENTS
Originally enacted in 1872, the original text of the mail fraud
statute provided:
That if any person having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either
opening or intending to open correspondence or communica-
tion with any other person (whether resident within or outside
of the United States), by means of the post-office establishment
of the United States, or by inciting such other person to open
communication with the person so devising or intending, shall,
in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting so
to do), place any letter or packet in any post-office of the Unit-
ed States, or take or receive any therefrom, such person, so
misusing the post-office establishment, shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment, as
the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar m6nths.
The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge
offences to the number of three when committed within the
same six calendar months; but the court thereupon shall give a
single sentence, and shall proportion the punishment especially
to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office establish-
ment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme and
device.
Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323.
The original printing had a typographical error. It stated:
'That if any person having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either opening or
intending to open correspondence . . . ." The correction of "or"
to read "to" was judicially accomplished in the first reported deci-
sion construing the statute. Brand v. United States, 4 F. 394
(C.C.N.D.Y. 1880).
In 1889, Congress attempted to clarify the statute by including
certain specific schemes within the scope of the statute as
"schemes to defraud." The amended provision provided:
If any person having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or to sell, dispose of, loan, ex-
change, alter, give away, or distribute, supply, or furnish, or
procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, bank
notes, paper money, or any obligation or security of the United
19921
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
States or of any State, Territory, municipality, company, corpo-
ration, or person, or anything represented to be or intimated
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious articles, or any
scheme or artifice to obtain money by or through correspon-
dence, by what is commonly called the "sawdust swindle", or
"counterfeit money fraud", or by dealing or pretending-to deal
in what is commonly called "green articles," "green coin,"
"bills", "paper goods," "spurious Treasury notes," "United States
goods", "green cigars", or any other names or terms intended
to be understood as relating to such counterfeit or spurious
articles, to be effected by either opening or intending to open
correspondence or communication with any person, whether
resident within or outside the United States, by means of the
Post-Office Establishment of the United States, or by inciting
such other person or any person to open communication with
the person so devising or intending, shall, in and for executing
such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, place or cause
to be placed, any letter, packet, writing, circular, pamphlet, or
advertisement in any post-office, branch post-office, or street or
hotel letter-box of the United States, to be sent or delivered by
the said post-office establishment, or shall take or receive any
such therefrom, such person so misusing the post-office estab-
lishment shall, upon conviction, be punishable by a fine of not
more than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for not
more than eighteen months, or by both such punishments, at
the discretion of the court. The indictment, information, or
complaint may severally charge offenses to the number of three
when committed within the same six calendar months; but the
court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall propor-
tion the punishment especially to the degree in which the
abuse of the post-office establishment enters as an instrument
into such fraudulent scheme and device." [sic]
Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 5480, 25 Stat. 873. Congress also
changed the term "letter or packet" in the original statute to read
"letter, packet, writing, circular, pamphlet, or advertisement," and
the term "post-office" was changed to "post-office, branch post
office, or street or hotel letter box." Id.
In 1909, Congress again amended the statute. At this time,
Congress expressly amended the statute so as to eliminate the
mail-emphasizing language. The 1909 amended version read:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
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away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use
any counterfeit or spurious coin, bank note, paper money, or
any obligation or security of the United States, or of any State,
Territory, municipality, company, corporation, or person, or
anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious article, or any scheme or artifice to
obtain money by or through correspondence, by what is com-
monly called the "saw-dust swindle," or "counterfeit-money
fraud," or by dealing or pretending to deal in what is common-
ly called "green articles," "green coin," "green goods," "bills,"
"paper goods," "spurious Treasury notes," "United States
goods," "green cigars," or any other names or terms intended
to be understood as relating to such counterfeit or spurious
articles, shall, for the purpose of executing such scheme or
artifice or attempting so to do, place, or cause to be placed,
any letter, postal card, package, writing, circular, pamphlet, or
advertisement, whether addressed to any person residing within
or outside the United States, in any post-office, or station there-
of, or street or other letter box of the United States, or autho-
rized depository for mail matter, to be sent or delivered by the
post-office establishment of the United States, or shall take or
receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or without
the United States, or shall knowingly cause to be delivered by
mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at
which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is
addressed, any such letter, postal card, package, writing, circu-
lar, pamphlet, or advertisement, shall be fined not more than
one thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1130. The above
session laws were formally codified in 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1946). In
1948, when Title 18 was enacted into positive law, the mail fraud
statute was redesignated and is currently found at 18 U.S.C. 1341
(Supp. III 1991).
Congress next amended the now section 1341 in 1948. The
new version provided:
§ 1341. Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, or to sell, dispose or, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use
any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out
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to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, plac-
es in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Post Office Department, or takes or receives therefrom, any
such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by
mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at
which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is
addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 763.
Today the statute reads:
§ 1341. Frauds and swindles
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,
or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give
away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use
any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out
to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, plac-
es in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter
or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according
to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed
to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any
such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both. If the violation
affects a financial institution, such person shall be fined not
more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 1991).
Congress superseded the McNally decision by enacting the
latest "amendment" to the statute. Section 1346 reads:
§ 1346. Definition of "scheme or artifice to defraud"
For the purposes of this chapter, the term "scheme or
artifice to defraud" includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services.
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 1992).
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